Thomistica.net is happy to announce the healthy arrival of Mary Margaret Trabbic, the second daughter of Joseph and Rose Trabbic. Dr. Joseph Trabbic is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Ave Maria University. Since July he has served as an editor of Thomistica.net and its most frequent contributor.
Aquinas believes that human reason and good argumentation can get us pretty far. But he is also aware of their limits, as many recent commentators have emphasized. These limits are both natural and the result of sin. Thus, he thinks that grace and the cultivation of intellectual and moral virtue are important in the pursuit of knowledge; they can help us to overcome some (but only some) of these limits. You might say that, on Aquinas’s view, reason as it exists concretely is at its best not when it is “pure reason” but “impure reason.”
The topic of this post has to do with one aspect of “impure reason” in Aquinas. I would like to reflect briefly on the role that authority plays in Aquinas’s epistemology. All Aquinas scholars are familiar with his treatment of this matter in ST, I, 1, 8. The question here is whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argumentation. The following objection is raised:
If [sacred doctrine] is a matter of argument, the argument is either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting its end, because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), “faith has no merit in those things of which human reason brings its own experience.” Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.
Aquinas replies to this objection thus:
This doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says: “Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ” (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus: “As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His offspring” (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): “Only those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning.”
How might we think about the epistemic value that authority has for Aquinas? What does the above discussion tell us? Here is how Fr. Copleston understands the lesson Aquinas is teaching us here:
Aquinas was the last man to think that philosophical problems can be settled by appeal to great names. “Argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest” (ST, 1a, 1, 8 ad 2). In other words, an argument in favor of a given philosophical or scientific position is the weakest sort of argument when it rests simply on the prestige attaching to the name of an eminent philosopher or scientist. What counts is the intrinsic value of the argument, not the reputation of someone who has sponsored it in the past (Aquinas, 23).
And this is where Fr. Copleston leaves the question. This isn’t a bad reading of Aquinas’s text but, or so I would suggest, there is much more to be said, including some important qualifications to be made.
While Aquinas does say that the argument from authority is the weakest with respect to human reason, it is not weak simply. When it is based on the authority of divine revelation it is the strongest. And let us not forget that Aquinas dignifies sacra doctrina with the title scientia — we are not in the realm of opinion but are dealing with real knowledge. Furthermore, sacra doctrina is the most noble of the sciences and is wisdom beyond all human wisdom.
What is more, as Aquinas notes in his reply, sacra doctrina also makes use of the authority of doctors of the Church and the philosophers. Of course, appealing to them only gets us to the level of probability, but were Aquinas suspicious of the epistemic value of authority and only willing to allow an exception for revelation, we would not expect him to expand the possibilities of legitimate appeal to authority in the field of theology.
But if we put aside the importance that authority has in the science of sacra doctrina and return to its place in the context of human reason, I think we should be careful to observe that in ST, I, 1, 8, ad 2 Aquinas does not dismiss arguments from authority in this context. He says merely that they are the “weakest” of arguments. It is a commonplace in logic that appeals to authority only become fallacious when they are appeals to an illegitimate authority; appeals to legitimate authority are often quite reasonable even if it is rare that they definitively settle a dispute.
Aquinas is aware of and accepts such legitimate appeals to authority in the context of human reason. Not only is this obvious from what he says in the above passage from the Summa but in the De Veritate he suggests that it is reasonable for believers to assent to the truth of what God tells them “since even in dialectical matters there is an argument from authority” (14, 2, ad 9).
But Aquinas is willing to say something stronger than this about the positive role that authority plays in the pursuit of knowledge. Consider these remarks from ST, II-II, 4, 8, ad 2:
Other things being equal sight is more certain than hearing. But if the person from whom we hear greatly surpasses our capacity for understanding [i.e., because of his qualifications, authority on a subject matter], then hearing is more certain than sight. So, one with little knowledge is more certain about what he hears from a man of great knowledge, than about what is apparent to him according to his own reason [Sicut aliquis parvae scientiae magis certificatur de eo quod audit ab aliquo scientissimo quam de eo quod sibi secundum suam rationem videtur.].
This is a striking passage. There are situations, Aquinas thinks, in which I should place more trust in what I am told by another than what I can understand by my own reason. The comparison is probably unfair and anachronistic, but it seems that we are quite far from Descartes’s precept about not taking anything to be true save what I perceive clearly and distinctly with my mind, not to mention Kant’s conception of Aufklärung as daring to think for oneself.
And consider these lines from De Veritate, 14, 10:
To obtain eternal life it is necessary to have faith in those things which are beyond the grasp of reason. We can understand this from what follows. For a thing is brought from imperfection to perfection only through the activity of something perfect. Nor does the imperfect thing at once in the very beginning fully receive the action of that which is perfect; at first it receives it imperfectly and, later, more perfectly. And it continues in this way until it reaches perfection. This is evident in all physical things, which acquire a perfection gradually.
We see the same thing in human works, especially in the learning process. For in the beginning a man has incomplete knowledge, and, if he is to reach the perfection of science, needs an instructor to bring him to that perfection. Nor could the teacher do this unless he himself had full knowledge of the science, that is unless he understood the intelligible principles of the things which form the subject matter of the science. At the outset of his teaching, however, he does not explain to his pupil the intelligible principles of the things to be known which he intends to teach, because then, at the very beginning, the pupil would [have to] know the science perfectly. Instead, the teacher proposes some things, the principles of which the pupil does not understand when first taught, but will know later when he has made some progress in the science. For this reason it is said that the learner must believe. And he could not acquire mastery of the science in any other way unless he accepted without proof those things which he is taught at first and the arguments for which he cannot then understand.
Of course, Aquinas’s discussion of the teacher and the student and the acquisition of a science is made in the context of trying to explain the necessity of faith for attaining eternal life. But obviously Aquinas thinks that his example has to do with what is actually the case in education. I cannot acquire knowledge unless at the beginning I accept some, perhaps many, things on the teacher’s authority. (We don’t need to think of this literally as a teacher with students in a classroom. Books, traditions, can also be the relevant authorities.) This would seem to tell us, then, that in Aquinas’s mind authority does not only have an occasional or marginal function in the pursuit of knowledge but an indispensable function.
Remaining in the sphere of the sciences developed by human reason, we cannot neglect to mention Aquinas’s well-known discussion in ST, I, 1, 2 about certain lower disciplines receiving their principles not from the direct apprehension of these principles by the intellect but from higher disciplines.
Some of the foregoing observations of Aquinas, once we reflect on them, might in the end appear rather pedestrian. Who would deny that authority functions epistemically in the way that he says that it does? I have to admit that I do think that there is something very pedestrian about Aquinas’s comments. And yet we should ask ourselves whether we usually think of Aquinas as holding that authority has a positive part to play not only in sacred doctrine but also in the other sciences. And we might also ask whether Aquinas’s position on authority’s epistemic role jibes well with the view that thinkers like Descartes and Kant take of authority.
Plainly there is much more to be said about all of this but I will have to continue this inquiry another time.
***
UPDATE: I developed this post into a paper that I gave at the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas conference in Houston Oct. 19, 2013. Interested readers can find it here.
The Annual Maynooth Aquinas Lecture Series began in 1995 and was founded by the late Professor James McEvoy. This second volume arising from the conference series contains papers on a variety of Thomistic topics.
Brian Davies has a new book out from Oxford University Press bearing the title Thomas Aquinas on God and Evil. My August 30 post dealt with another book of Davies being published by OUP, a volume he edited together with Eleonore Stump called the Oxford Handbook of Aquinas.
While the Handbook has yet to hit bookstores, Thomas Aquinas on God and Evil became available not long ago.
For several years now Davies has been defending the (for some) provocative thesis that, for Aquinas, God is not a moral agent. One argument that Davies offers in favor of this claim is that moral agents, as Aquinas understands them, are under obligation to a moral law. Since in Aquinas’s view God is not subject to any law, it is wrong to think of his God as a moral agent. (Please do not take my quick summary as the best account of this particular argument of Davies. Read him for yourself if you’re interested.)
If God is not a moral agent, Davies says, this makes a lot of the so-called “problem of evil” disappear because God can’t be expected to behave as human beings do.
Not only does Davies attribute this understanding of God and moral agency to Aquinas, he also thinks that it’s the right understanding to have, as is evident from The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil and some of Davies’s earlier writings.
In The Thomist Tradition (2002) Brian Shanley objects to Davies’s interpretation of Aquinas on this point and Davies responds to Shanley in The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil (2006).
I see that Davies takes up this thesis once again in Thomas Aquinas on God and Evil. If questions about God, goodness, and evil exercise you, you might consider giving Davies’s new book a read.
SOCIÉTÉ THOMISTE
CENTRE D’ÉTUDES DU SAULCHOIR
Journée Thomas d’Aquin
samedi 3 décembre 2011
Contingence, nécessité et Providence chez Thomas d’Aquin
09 h 30 Accueil
10 h Emmanuel DURAND (Paris)
L’extension de la Providence aux contingences et son application aux
singulier selon Thomas d’Aquin
11 h 30 Pasquale PORRO (Bari)
Nécessité, contingence et hazard dans l’univers de Thomas d’Aquin
13 h Pause repas
14 h 15 G. BERCEVILLE, M. BORGO, I. COSTA, R. IMBACH, A. OLIVA
Présentation de quelques ouvrages de philosophie et de
théologie médiévales
Les séances auront lieu au Saulchoir, Salle « Dumont » du Centre ISTINA, 45, rue de la Glacière Paris XIIIe (Métro 6, station Glacière. Bus 21, arrêt Normann) Entrée libre.
Nous vous prions de communiquer votre participation au repas (15 €) avec la communauté de Saint-Jacques, avant le 21 novembre, en écrivant à :
Adriano Oliva : aoliva@commissio-leonina.org
This book, edited by Kent Emery, Rusell Friedman, and Andrea Speer (Brill: 2011) is a gift to noted Medievalist and long-time Boston College professor, Dr. Stephen Brown, in honor of his 75th birthday. Below is a description of the volume’s contents and contributors from Brill’s website.
The 35 contributions to this Festschrift are disposed in five parts: Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy, Epistemology and Ethics, Philosophy and Theology, Theological Questions, Text and Context. These five headings articulate Stephen Brown’s underlying conception and understanding of medieval philosophy and theology, which the editors share: The main theoretical and practical issues of the ‘long medieval’ intellectual tradition are rooted in an epistemology and a metaphysics, which must be understood not as separated from theology but as being in a fruitful exchange with theological conceptions and questions; further, in order to understand the longue durée of this tradition of philosophical and theological discourse, scholars must engage the textual traditions that conveyed it.
Contributors are Jan A. Aertsen, Carlos Bazan, Oliva Blanchette, Olivier Boulnois, Anthony Celano, William J. Courtenay, Anne A. Davenport, Alain de Libera, Thomas Dewender, John P. Doyle, Stephen D. Dumont, Kent Emery, Jr., Juan Carlos Flores, Christopher D. Schabel, Fritz S. Pedersen, Russell L. Friedman, André Goddu, Wouter Goris, Michael Gorman, Simo Knuuttila, Theo Kobusch, Paul Joseph LaChance, Matthew Lamb, Matthew Levering, R. James Long, Steven P. Marrone, Lauge Nielsen, Timothy Noone, Thomas M. Osborne,.Klaus Rodler, Risto Saarinen, John T. Slotemaker, Jean Céleyrette, Jean-Luc Solere, Andreas Speer, Carlos Steel, Eileen Sweeney, Jeremy Wilkins, John F. Wippel.
The 2011 PMR Conference, with the theme of “Natura: The splendor of these created things…” will be getting underway in a few weeks; set in the beautiful locale of the Villanova Conference Center just outside of Philadelphia, this conference usually includes a high concentration of sessions in Medieval theology and philosophy, and this year’s conference is no exception.
In addition to multiple sessions that would be of interest to students or scholars of Thomas Aquinas, the keynote speakers this year are Bruce Marshall and Richard Schenk. As is the PMR tradition, the conference concludes with a Sunday morning roundtable discussion between the participants and the keynote speakers, which is always fruitful and enlightening.
You may view the entire program here:
http://www.villanova.edu/mission/augustinianinstitute/conferences/pmr/program.htm
but here are few excerpts of the sessions with substantial Thomas content:
1. Thomas Aquinas on Nature: Divine, Human, and Cosmic
Room 115/117
Chair: Michael Waddell, Saint Mary’s College
Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Nature and the Ecstatic Self-Determination of God’s Identity
Gary Culpepper, Providence College
Thomas Aquinas on the Principles of Human Nature and Original Sin
Robert Barry, Providence College
Thomas Aquinas on the Natural Foundations of Cosmic Liturgy
Matthew Cuddeback, Providence College
5. God, Causes, and Explanations: Issues in Medieval Philosophy
Room 114
Chair: Michael Fatigati, Villanova University
Causes of Nature and Causes of Existence: Avicenna’s Innovations on the Nature of Aristotelian Efficient Causality
Daniel D. DeHaan, University of St. Thomas
Aquinas and Some Theories of Explanation
Peter Weigel, Washington College
The Seeds of Creation: Aquinas on the rationes seminales
Marco Emerson Hernandez, University of Notre Dame
7. The Nature of Theology: Franciscan and Dominican Perspectives
Room 115/117
Chair: Anna Moreland, Villanova University
Sponsored by the Boston Colloquy on Historical Theology
Organizer: Boyd Taylor Coolman
Salvation History, Human Affectivity, and the Nature of Theology in Aquinas and the Summa fratris Alexander
Boyd Taylor Coolman, Boston College
‘A Particularly Agitated Topic’: Bonaventure and Aquinas on the Subject of Theology
Gregory LaNave, Dominican House of Studies
The Supreme Authority of Theology: Ockham against the Papacy
Ian Levy, Providence College
Response: James F. Keating, Providence College
SESSION III: PLENARY ADDRESS 4:00 PM -6:00 PM Room 115
Bruce D. Marshall
Lehman Professor of Christian Doctrine
Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University
Is Nature a Problem for Grace? Aquinas, Scotus, and the Modern Debate about the Supernatural
13. Grace Modifying Nature: How Christian Revelation Changed a Concept in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas
Room 115/117
Chair: Anna Moreland, Villanova University
“Substantial Nature” and the Hypostatic Union
Michael Gorman, Catholic University of America
St. Thomas Aquinas and the Gifts of Wisdom and Counsel
James Stroud, Catholic University of America
Propassiones in Christ, Propassiones in Us
Barrett Turner, Catholic University of America
Donum habituale: Systematic Divisions of Grace and the Gifts of the Holy Spirit
John Meinert, Catholic University of America
15. Nature & Grace: Spirit, Humanity, & Sacrament among the Early Reformed
Room 103
Chair: R. Emmet McLaughlin, Villanova University
Natura et Spiritus Sanctus: Comparing Aquinas and Calvin
Berek Q. Smith, Nashotah House Theological Seminary
Nature, Grace, and the Reformed Objection to Donum Superadditum
S. Joel Garver, LaSalle University
The Nature of Grace: Calvin’s Semeiotic Sacramentology
Scott Schultz, Independent Scholar, Jacksonville, FL
The Theology of Nature in Reformation Theology and Protestant Orthodoxy
Leah D. Schade, Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia
19. Thomas Aquinas on Causality and Grace in the Perfection of Nature
Room 115/117
Chair: Carl Vater, Catholic University of America
The End of Nature: Aquinas on Natural Final Causality
Corey Barnes, Oberlin College
‘The dignity of causing’: Aquinas’ Mature Doctrine of God’s goodness in grace in creation
Daria Spezzano, University of Notre Dame
Human Merit and Divine Causality: The Splendid Perfection of Nature in Thomas Aquinas
Shawn M. Colberg, University of Notre Dame
23. Thomas Aquinas on Human and Divine Nature
Room 114
Chair: Paul Camacho, Villanova University
Aquinas on Debitum Naturae
Nicholas Kahm, Catholic University of America
‘From Him and Through Him and To Him”: the Incarnate Word as Exemplar and Consummation of Cosmos and History in St. Thomas Aquinas
Erik Van Versendaal, Independent Scholar, Washington, DC
Controlling Habits of Thought in Thomas Aquinas
Matthew Kruger, Boston College
24. Creation in St. Thomas Aquinas
Room 115/117
Chair: Michael Waddell, Saint Mary’s College
Is God Necessarily a Creator? Tensions between Immutability and the Creative Act in Aquinas
Brock Scheller, Fordham University
Aquinas on Creation: Transitive or Immanent Action?
Gregory T. Doolan, Catholic University of America
God as Ipsum Intelligere Subsistens in Aquinas’s de Potentia
Andrew M. Haines, Catholic University of America
26. Disputed Questions: Issues in Scholastic Thought
Room 120
Chair: Shawn M. Colberg, University of Notre Dame
The Genuine Experience of Pain in the Human Nature of Christ: Patristic Questions and Medieval Answers to ‘Some Greatly Obscure Chapters of St. Hilary.’
Eric Mabry, University of St. Thomas
The Natural Desire for Bodily Integrity: A Scholastic Debate about the Separated Soul
Ezra Sullivan, O.P., St. Gertrude Church, Cincinnati, OH
Session VII: Plenary Session
Richard Schenk, OP
President, , Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt
The Limits of Nature as a Mark of her Splendor. Thomas Aquinas on the Role of The Imperfect in the Universe
Sunday Roundtable-The Splendor of These Created Things
An Open Conversation with Bruce Marshall and Richard Schenk
I recently came across some lines about Aquinas’s style penned by Catherine Pickstock and by A.N. Williams that I found perceptive or, more minimally, thought provoking. On the chance that they might resonate with others, I’ve decided to present them here. First Pickstock:
[E]xegesis is easy; it is interpretation that is difficult. And Aquinas, more than most thinkers, requires interpretation. Some thinkers, like Heidegger, appear on the surface to be obscure and deep, but on analysis are revealed as offering all too clear and readily statable positions. But as Rudi te Velde very well intimates, with Aquinas the opposite pertains. Only superficially is he clear, but on analysis one discovers that he does not offer us a decently confined “Anglo-Saxon” lucidity, but rather the intense light of Naples and Paris which is ultimately invisible in its very radiance — rendering the wisest of us, for Aquinas after Aristotle, like owls blinking in the noonday. Of course it is true that Aquinas does indeed refute shaky positions with supreme economy, simplicity and clarity of argumentation, but the arcanum of his teaching lies not here. It resides rather in the positions he does affirm, often briefly and like a residue, akin to Sherlock Holmes’s last remaining solution, which must be accepted in all its implausibility, when other solutions have been shown to be simply impossible (Truth in Aquinas, 20-21).
I know that not all Thomists are sympathetic with Pickstock or the whole “Radical Orthodoxy” project, and I do have my own misgivings in that direction, but I have to admit that these are arresting words. Is she unfair to Heidegger? Maybe. The reference to Heidegger might not be arbitrary since it seems that it is often precisely continentals who are so critical of Aquinas’s language and style, and not merely because they find it dull. Thus in Heidegger and Aquinas John Caputo writes:
St. Thomas thought Being in the terms that were granted to him … Thomas exhausted the possibilities of thinking Christianity in terms of the metaphysics of Plato, Aristotle, and Scholasticism. But his genius was decidedly not to bring this tradition as a whole into question, to question the terms that were handed down to him, to wonder about the sending of Being in the Roman-Latin language [that] he spoke as a magister, to wonder whence these terms and categories, this language, this whole metaphysical constellation sprang. From the standpoint of Heidegger, Thomas thinks naively within this tradition and leaves the original sending of Being in oblivion … [T]he Romans, the builders of roads and empires, rendered this word [i.e., energeia] as actualitas; hence, they conceived Being in terms of acting and action (agere, actio, actus), of doing, making, producing. The metaphysics of “actuality” in St. Thomas is a captive of this metaphysical scheme, which is then wedded to the Christian doctrine of creation (5-6).
Of course, Thomists will say that something has gone horribly wrong with Caputo’s understanding of Aquinas and they will be right. Pickstock’s comments suggest a possible route of response if not the only route. Still Caputo’s concern shows an approach to texts that is admirably non-Cartesian, I mean he takes seriously the material, historical dimension of Aquinas’s thought, drawing out its philosophical and theological import, although in my view he is confused about that import.
As for Pickstock’s quip about “decently confined ‘Anglo-Saxon’ lucidity,” I don’t know how else to read this but as a swipe at analytic thought and perhaps analytic Thomism. It is funny but certainly unfair. Personally, I find a great deal of value in analytic philosophy and theology and in analytic Thomism (despite the fact that I don’t consider myself a part of these groups). Oh well, I’ll let others debate this.
Now the words of A.N. Williams, who happens to be Pickstock’s colleague in the Faculty of Divinity at Cambridge:
One thread that runs through most of my work is Aquinas, whom I have loved since my first months studying theology. He is the author who figures most prominently in my research and to whom I appeal the most when teaching. The patristic and medieval periods offer such a wealth of extraordinary thought, rich and vibrant in the textures of its prose, but also stunning in its intellectual power. Even so, for me Aquinas stands out even in this distinguished company: the clarity, range and acuity of his thought seems to me unparalleled. Although his prose is pared down to the bone, its structure is so elegant it still sometimes takes my breath away. I smile inwardly as, year in and year out, I see students make the journey from complaining at the beginning of term “This is too hard!” or “This is dry!” to, by the end of term, exclaiming “Wow! This is amazing!”
This passage comes from Williams’s profile on her Cambridge faculty page. There is a clear parallel between her understanding of the relationship of style and thought in Aquinas and Pickstock’s. But Williams does seem to appreciate the surface of the Thomistic text more than Pickstock. And I think many of us can relate to what she says about the apprehension of students when first reading Aquinas. I don’t want to pick on literature majors, but they are often the hardest to convince of Aquinas’s worth! Sometimes they just cannot get beyond the apparent dryness of language and style. They think it betrays a dryness of thought if not life. (It couldn’t be that my colleagues in the literature department are aiding and abetting them in their distaste, could it? “There is an ancient quarrell…” and all that.)
But another thing that is interesting about Williams’s comments is that she isn’t just saying, “Try to look past the surface.” She sees beauty there too: “Although his prose is pared down to the bone, its structure is so elegant it still sometimes takes my breath away.” Some people might be staggered, even offended by this statement. And how would Caputo respond? It might be difficult for him to imagine anyone reacting to Aquinas in the way Williams does. Did he miss something?
Many people know that the Via Cassia is the road on which Hilaire Belloc, somewhere south of the intersection with the Via Trionfale, first caught a glimpse of Rome — this at least according to Belloc’s account of the event in his celebrated travelogue The Path to Rome. As I understand, that was in 1901.
Fewer people — mostly Jesuits and devotees of St. Ignatius of Loyola — know that the founder of the Society of Jesus, who was also on his way to Rome, had a vision on the Via Cassia in which he heard the words “Ego vobis Romae propitius ero” (more or less: “I will be propitious to you in Rome.”). Ignatius interepted the statement thus: “I do not know whether we shall be crucified in Rome, but Jesus will be propitious.” This occurred in the village of La Storta, which is only a little north of where Belloc saw Rome for the first time. A simple chapel now stands in La Storta to commemorate Ignatius’s vision. The vision took place in 1537.
Probably only some grumpy old Aquinas scholars know that the Via Cassia also had an important place in the early life of St. Thomas. He had set out on foot with other Dominicans along the Via Cassia — traveling away from Rome — in 1244 just before Pentecost, heading for a general chapter in Bologna.
On hearing of this intended journey, Thomas’s mother, who, as is well known, did not want him to be a poor friar, sent his brother Rinaldo, who was camped nearby at Frederick II’s headquarters at Terni (a complex struggle was going on involving Frederick, Innocent IV, and Cardinal Ranieri), to intercept Thomas and bring him home to Roccasecca. This Rinaldo managed to do, meeting Thomas near Acquapendente (around 85 miles north of La Storta). Thus began the infamous episode of Aquinas’s “imprisonment” (probably too strong of a word) by his family, which ended in the Summer of 1245, when he was permitted to return to the Dominicans in Naples.
On your next trip to Italy you might consider a jaunt on the Via Cassia, Strada Regionale 2 (formerly Strada Statale 2). See the map above. The Cassia is the road marked “S2”. As far as I know, the route of the Cassia has changed very little since the eighth century, maybe a few deviations here and there. So, the stretch of it that you take may very well be the same stretch traveled by Aquinas, Ignatius, and Belloc.
One of our contributors, Michael Dougherty, has just published a book with Cambridge University Press entitled Moral Dilemmas in Medieval Thought: From Gratian to Aquinas.
According to the preface, Chapters 4 and 5 incorporate revised material from previously published articles. But the rest of the book is fresh work.
William Mann (University of Vermont) has a review of Michael’s book at the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews site. Mann notes in his review that Michael also addresses contemporary discussions of moral dilemmas and that he (Mann) “is one whose views are taken to task.”
For Michael’s own overview of the scope of his book, I present the first paragraph of the book’s Introduction:
Is moral wrongdoing ever genuinely unavoidable? That is, will anyone ever experience real conflicting obligations at a given moment and thereby be compelled to act wrongly? This study considers several medieval theorists who dealt with the question of whether moral dilemmas are part of the moral life. As it is often assumed that serious theorizing about moral dilemmas was first achieved in modern philosophy, only to be refined further by contemporary thinkers, this book analyzes a rather neglected part of the history of Western ethical thought. The common view assumes that during the medieval period all moral theorists adhered to the maxim “ought implies can.” In contrast to that view, this book identifies medieval adherents to “ought but cannot.” Several medieval thinkers not only wrestled with the problem of reconciling the experience of moral conflict with the widespread assumption that no one should ever be forced to do wrong, but they also propounded their solutions with a level of sophistication that may be surprising to present-day philosophers. In light of these overlooked medieval contributions, the history of moral dilemma theory must be re-written. This book discloses that much of what seems particular to twentieth-century moral theorizing was quite well known long ago.
I think Michael’s book will prove valuable on many levels. It will be of historical interest since the medieval treatment of moral dilemmas is still a fairly new field of research. And the study of the handling of the problem of moral dilemmas by these great thinkers – among whom are Gratian, Aquinas, and Capreolus – will surely help us too to reason more intelligently about this issue. In general we can also see this book as another step forward in the recovery of medieval philosophical thought, not for mere “antiquarian” (in Nietzsche’s sense) purposes but as a light to think by in our own time. We’ve come a long way since nineteenth and early twentieth century historians of philosophy denied the Middle Ages’ philosophical relevance.
Below is a query passed on to us by a friend of thomistica.net:
A friend of mine is finishing her dissertation on marriage in Aquinas and, obviously, has drawn heavily on the Scriptum on the Fourth Book of the Sentences. She is wondering if anyone has done any detailed work on how the Supplement was fashioned by Reginald et alia. Does anyone know where they got their plan of questions and articles? Is there any indication that Thomas left a framework beyond the prologues that outline the content?
If any thomistica.net readers are aware of any work done on the question of the ordo of the Supplementum, please respond by posting a comment.
Valete,
RWN
On Wednesday, July 27th we posted an announcement about a new volume on Aquinas’ disputed question, De unione verbi incarnati. Below is the second installment of an interview with the author, translator, and editor of the volume, German scholar Prof. Dr. Klaus Obenauer. Click here to read the first installment.
Thomistica.net: Your commentary on the text is nearly 500 pages. How long did the translation and commentary take you to complete?
Dr. Obenauer: It´s difficult to say, because of the interruptions and overlaps with other activities, such as teaching etc. All in all, I’d say about three years altogether.
Thomistica.net: Which aspect of the commentary was most enjoyable for you to work on? And, which aspect do you think makes the biggest contribution to scholarship in relation to the De unione and Aquinas’ Christology?
Dr. Obenauer: I’ll limit my comments to articles 3–5. - And insofar I succeeded (as I hope) in offering innovative contributions and insights the whole commentary on these articles is, I think, relevant.
With regard to the text of De unione itself the famous article 4 (on Christ’s esse) is, without question, of the highest interest to most. But I hope to have shown that the specific content and development of articles 3 (on Christ’s Unity) and 5 (Christ’s operations) are also of primary interest. These articles (3 and 5) have been, up to now, not sufficiently appreciated (pace Patfoort).
Concerning my personal preferences, I´d say, that in some way, I enjoyed commenting on article 3 the most. It has its own speculative profundity. Even though it bridges with article 4, article 3 is fascinating because of its symmetry (“simpliciter unum propter unum suppositum, secundum quid duo propter duas naturas”). This degree of symmetry is lacking, at least in terms of resplendence, in article 4.
Thomistica.net: Some commentators on Aquinas, because of the uniqueness of certain aspects of the De Unione, such as article 4, have either dismissed the work as spurious or relegated it to Aquinas’ early period. You, however, argue that the De unione is both a mature articulation and a work that should be dated rather late in Aquinas’ career. What are your reasons for these positions?
Dr. Obenauer: The days of assigning the De unione to Aquinas’ “early period” or viewing the text as “spurious” are past. The very opposite judgment is held to be the “common sense” position nowadays. But whereas classical historians, such as Pelster, Synave and Torrell, have assigned the De unione to the end of the second Parisian period, there are good reasons to think of ca. 1270 as the year of writing.
This suggestion is made formally by Concetta Luna (in the context of her edition of the ‘lectura sententiarum’ of Aegidus of Rome [cf. my historical comment on the first article]); I have tried to demonstrate that this is a veritable scenario. But I do not see it as more than that! There are a number of reasons to read De unione 3 and 5 as improvements over the parallel passages in the tertia pars.
And, as already shown by Pelster and Synave and illustrated in my own synopsis, the striking parallels from De unione 1 to STh III, 2, 1 and 2 do not allow the redaction of De unione to be too far removed (in time) from that of the tertia pars.
Thomistica.net: Prior to the publication of your volume, the French translation and commentary by Marie-Hélène Deloffre, “Question dispute L’union du verbe incarné” (Vrin: 2000) was, perhaps, the most sustained treatment of the De Unione in print. What are some of the points of agreement and divergence between your reading of the De Unione and that of Sr. Deloffre’s?
Dr. Obenauer: I admire the contribution of Sr. Deloffre as a very valuable repertorium in matters of St. Thomas´ “Opera Omnia” and the historical background of the De unione. With respect to her options as a historical and systematical theologian, Sr. Deloffre is very indebted to the classical “theory of integration” developed by Hermann Diepen and his followers. Accordingly she interprets the saltem prima facie divergences in the texts with hermeneutics of harmonizing.
From the point of view of a historian I am not in agreement with this reading. In my view, De unione 4 is a deviation! In STh III, 17, 2, for example, there is no mention of or place for a “hidden second substantial or non-accidental esse.” The framework of the distinctions leaves no room for the assertions of De unione 4—even if it is not completely impossible to identify some ambiguities in III, 17, 2 too.
On this point, in particular, I am in agreement with the analysis of A. Patfoort. Even more: I think that Bernhard of Auvergne, Capreolus and Billot have been the legitimate interpretive heirs to STh III, 17, 2 (and the parallel passages). As a systematic theologian I have put myself forward as being in favor of a synthetic conception. I articulate my own interpretive option this way: The conception of the ‘unio secundum subsistentiam’ has to fix, principally, our understanding of how to apply the so called ‘esse personale Verbi’ (as the subsistence or personality of the hypostasis of the divine Son) to the human nature.
This is a crucial point: the application of the divine esse to Christ’s human nature has to be made without making a (even if only conceptual) distinction between the subsistence and the act of substantial existence. In addition to this it may be asked, if there is room for a (‘etiam ratione actus’) second substantial esse as a (as I call it) “formal secum-ferential” of the “esse personale” in my interpretation? In order to safeguard the appropriateness of the “formal efficiency” of the divine esse in favor of the-Son-as-being-man, a second esse that performs only this function does agree with my postion, as long as it does not differ (numerically) from divine esse (‘in nova habitudine’) as ‘esse-simpliciter’ and ‘esse-hominem’. This way, and only this way, there is a kind of convergence between myself and the “integrationists,” but perhaps more so a trace of Louis Billot and Maurice De la Taille.
Thomistica.net: Finally, tell us a little bit about how the book has been received?
Dr. Obenauer: The reception of my book is in the very beginning stages, and in Germany there are only a few scholars interested and able to give such quick feedback. All that I have heard up to now is positive.
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