Concepts of Numbers? Consequences for the Synthetic A Priori?

Just what 'is' the concept of a number? Further, what is the relation of this concept to a picture image of the quantity that corresponds to the concept? 

When it comes to the number 3, one can easily picture some image representing the quantitative value of 3. But let's try 37. That's harder. However, if I am familiar with numbers, I can churn out an image representing the value. I can place 37 dots on the paper, for instance. Here, we have a relationship between some intellectual idea and a physical 'phantasm' as it were, which we can generate. The paper will have better memory than I; hence, I need paper or a slate. Whatever this idea of the number is, then, comprised therein is the 'rule' for creating the phantasm. (Here, let phantasm have its impression on a physical medium.) 

Now, it seems to me that in the rule regarding the construction of the phantasm for 37 is any set of rules for the generation of, say, factors and sets of numbers equalling the number 37. If so, included in the rule for the construction of an image of 37 is the rule by which I can judge that concept from which I can construct the image of 13 added to the image of 24, equals 37. The latter rule seems included in the very rule by which I churn out the phantasm for 37. So, if the number were 36, I'd include in the rules included in 36 also those of its interesting factors (those besides 1 and 36). 

Now, to say that in the concept 37 I do not see the concept "13 plus 24" seems correct at first sight. If it is correct and yet our judgment of its truth is necessary, it seems that we have a synthetic a priori judgment. 

However, I suggest that whatever darkness lies between the concept 37 and the concept 13 + 24 is similar to the darkness that lies between the concept 37 and the very rule whereby I construct the image of 37. Just what is this latter relationship? 

In short, if it is correct that the concept "13 plus 24" is not included in 37, then, similarly, the rule for generating the image of 37 is not in the concept 37. But is it not obviously false that the rule for generating the image of 37 is not in the idea of 37, whatever an idea of 37 is? Would not all agree that the rule for generating the image of 37 is most certainly in the idea of 37? The alleged difficulty of finding in the concept 37 the concept 13+24 is really indistinguishable from the difficulty of finding the phantasm of 37 without the process of executing the rule. From the concept 37 I cannot perceive at once the image representative of 13+24.

However, I clearly do grasp from 37 the rule for the construction of the image of that quantity. Similarly, I grasp the various sets of rules tucked in the number; or I can acquire the habit of such knowledge; or I can work it out case by case, just as I work out case by case the image of the quantity 37 or 43 or 317. 

What does this matter? If it is claimed that the way I grasp the necessity of the rules regarding the parts of 37 is that of a 'synthetic a priori judgment', I respond by saying that the way I grasp the necessity of the rule regarding the creation of its phantasm is a 'synthetic a priori judgment.' But would anyone grant that one grasps the relation of a rule to the idea of a number by way of synthetic judgment? If few would, why would not few also agree that the relations of the concepts need not be grasped by synthetic judgment but rather that analytic judgment is what occurs? Further, if the relation of my concept of a number to the rule generating its image is grasped by synthetic judgment, what in fact would be linked in the judgment except a symbol and a rule? My concept becomes simply a symbol. Would all concepts vanish? Perplexity. What are the relations between concept, symbol, and the various rules? What is the concept of a determinate number?

The constructive character of arithmetic here certainly includes the relationship of concept to phantasm. Insofar as phantasm is required for insight, one can say that this constructive character is constitutes a dispositional condition for the growth in ideas, as one enters the science. I think the science of classical geometry follows a similar pattern. 

The irreformability of Catholic teaching on the death penalty

Ed Feser and Joseph Bessette have a book forthcoming from Ignatius Press entitled By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed: A Catholic Defense of the Death Penalty. In an essay at Catholic World Report, they summarize some of the book's key points. The essay is in two parts. The second part will be published later this week. I'll update this post with a link to the second part when it comes out.

Here's how Feser and Bessette formulate one of the claims they defend:

[I]t is the irreformable teaching of the Church that capital punishment can in principle be legitimate, not merely to ensure the physical safety of others when an offender poses an immediate danger (a case where even John Paul II was willing to allow for the death penalty), but even for purposes such as securing retributive justice and deterring serious crime.

To this Feser and Bessette add:

What is open to debate is merely whether recourse to the death penalty is in practice the best option given particular historical and cultural circumstances. That is a “prudential” matter about which popes have no special expertise.

If you are interested in this topic, I recommend Feser and Bessette's essay. I'm sure their forthcoming book will be quite good too.

***

UPDATE: Here's the link to the second part of Feser and Bessette's essay.

Bibliography on Luther and Joint Declaration

The short Dulles piece on the joint declaration is here: http://www.firstthings.com/article/1999/12/two-languages-of-salvation-the-lutheran-catholic-joint-declaration

I should mention that Dulles's last few paragraphs seem very weak to me.  It is written for a popular audience, but some of the problems might be with Dulles' own formation and thought.  "Scholasticism" is somehow one (and only one?) among many different "thought forms," and Lutheranism an incompatible "thought form."  He doesn't show much knowledge of Luther or later generations of Lutherans.  Luther himself could and did write like a scholastic, but in my opinion he just wasn't very good at it.  Maybe Dulles is comparing Luther's more popular works with more scholastic Catholic theological works, and doesn't have in mind Protestant Orthodoxy.  But there are also a host of Catholic popular works from the time.    

Chris Malloy has a lot of material, including a whole book on the topic of the joint declaration: Hisbook is at https://www.amazon.com/Engrafted-Christ-American-University-Studies/dp/0820474088

See also his:

"The Nature of Justifying Grace: A Lacuna in the Joint Declaration" The Thomist 65 (2001): 93–120. 

There is a piece on Thomas More on Luther on Justification: http://www.thomasmorestudies.org/docs/Angelicum90pages761-98.pdf 

Then there is: "Sola salus, Or Fides caritate formata: The Premised Promise of Luther's Dilemma" Fides Catholica 2 (2008): 375-432.

For my own understanding of Luther, I personally have profited greatly from non-Catholic authors.  For a general account of 16th century theories, see Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: AHistory of the Christian Doctrine of Justification. 2nd ed.  For Luther’s relationship to Thomism in particular, see “Luther Among the Thomists,” in David Steinmetz’s Luther in Context.  I am personally indebted to the late Steinmetz, who was a great figure in the study of the 16th-century.  His Luther and Staupitz has fascinating material on his early development.  For Luther himself, Steinmetz recommended Heiko Oberman’s Luther: Man between God and the Devil.  I also have found helpful Bernhard Lohse’s Martin Luther’s Theology: Its Historical and Systematic Development.  Again, none of these sources are Catholic, but I think that they are helpful for someone with an appropriate Catholic background.  Steinmetz was frustrated because he said that now even many Catholic theologians and theology students don't know enough Catholic theology to distinguish their own position (or different Catholic positions) from those of the Reformers. 

Remembering Fritz

Frederick “Fritz” Wilhelmsen (1923-1996) was, in my estimation at least, one of the great Thomists of the last century. So, I thought it fitting to mark in some way the 20th anniversary of his death. I’m a month late for the anniversary – Wilhelmsen died on May 21, 1996 – but I don’t think that matters much.

Wilhelmsen grew up in Detroit. During World War II, he interrupted his studies at the University of Detroit to serve for three years as an army medic. He eventually earned his BA in 1947 from another Jesuit institution, the University of San Francisco. He completed his MA in philosophy in 1948 at the University of Notre Dame, where he studied under Gerald Phelan and Yves Simon. He completed his PhD in philosophy at the Universidad de Madrid in 1958, with a dissertation on Jacques Maritain.

Wilhelmsen taught at Santa Clara University, Al-Hikma University in Baghdad, the Universidad de Navarra, and lastly at the University of Dallas, where he taught philosophy and political theory for 31 years.

His work ranged from metaphysics and epistemology to political theory and cultural criticism. During his lifetime, Wilhelmsen authored seventeen books, among which, the better known are: Hilaire Belloc: No Alienated Man. A Study in Christian Integration (1954); Man’s Knowledge of Reality. An Introduction to Thomistic Epistemology (1956); The Metaphysics of Love (1962); The Paradoxical Structure of Existence (1970); Christianity and Political Philosophy (1978); Citizen of Rome: Reflections from the Life of a Roman Catholic (1980); and Being and Knowing: Reflections of a Thomist (1991). Several of these books collect separately published papers.

Wilhelmsen co-authored two books with Jane Bret: The War in Man: Media and Machines (1970) and Telepolitics: The Politics of Neuronic Man (1972).

You can find a bibliography of Wilhelmsen’s writings here.

Since there are several good overviews of Wilhelmsen’s life and work available online, I'll forego going any further with the one in this post. Here are four of those overviews:

J. Lehrberger, O. Cist., Christendom’s Troubadour: Frederick D. Wilhelmsen

D.J. D’Elia, Citizen of Rome: Dr. Fredrick D. Wilhelmsen

J.O. Nelson, Wilhelmsen, Frederick

UD Philosophy Department, Frederick D. Wilhelmsen (1923-1996): A UD Legend (Go to p. 2.)

A last word...

It's truly sad that Fritz is gone. We could really use him right now.

Pope Francis Says Luther Correct on Justification

Is it possible to hold 1) that Luther's views on justification are heretical, 2) that Pope Francis states that Luther's views on justification are correct, and yet not conclude 3) that Pope Francis himself is a heretic?

I take it that 1) is indisputable.  All Catholics are bound to accept 1), on the basis of Trent but I think also the whole previous tradition.  It would probably be applicable to what is condemned by Trent and not Luther's own words, but it is hard to argue that the two are unconnected.  Look at Chemnitz or Luther himself.  2) is correct if we believe the recent transcript.  I take it that 3) is possible but most probably incorrect.

It seems to me that 1) and 2) would entail 3) only if it were restated as "Pope Francis assents to Luther's views on justification," and it would entail formal heresy with contumacy only if it were restated as "Pope Francis assents to Luther's views on justification in defiance of earlier Church teaching."  The Pope may have had in mind the joint declaration on justification.  As Chris Malloy, Avery Dulles, and others have shown (which is not at all difficult), this declaration was theologically incompetent, and motivated more by false ecumenical ends than by historical or theological accuracy.    If the Pope consequently doesn't understand the issues, it is arguable that he is not a heretic.  Hence 1) and 2) can be true, and yet 3) false.  There is a difference between being intellectually unable or perhaps unwilling to grasp certain basic issues and being a heretic.

For the transcript, see http://m.ncregister.com/daily-news/full-text-pope-francis-in-flight-press-conference-from-armenia/#.V3FsU00UXIV

"I think that the intentions of Martin Luther were not mistaken. He was a reformer. Perhaps some methods were not correct. But in that time, if we read the story of the Pastor, a German Lutheran who then converted when he saw reality — he became Catholic — in that time, the Church was not exactly a model to imitate. There was corruption in the Church, there was worldliness, attachment to money, to power...and this he protested. Then he was intelligent and took some steps forward justifying, and because he did this. And today Lutherans and Catholics, Protestants, all of us agree on the doctrine of justification.  On this point, which is very important, he did not err."

I wonder if it is harder being a Catholic now than in Luther's time?

Gardeil on Garrigou-Lagrange: Nothing New Under the Sun

It seems to me that many contemporary Thomists describe as "Post-Vatican II" what have been common Thomist criticisms of Jesuits and others concerning happiness, the virtues, the beatitudes, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, etc.  I was surprised to recently read the following comments of Fr. A. Gardeil on Garrigou-LaGrange in the Revue Thomiste 24 (1929), p. 272:

Par contre, le T. R. P. Garrigou-Lagrange dans son article de la Revue Thomiste: L'Habitation de la Sainte Trinité et l'Expérience mystique, parlant de la manière dont je conçois et explique la divine habitation et l'expérience de Dieu qui en procède, m'a apporté ce précieux suffrage : « C'est là une grande confirmation de la doctrine que nous soutenons depuis plusieurs années ... La contemplation infuse des mystères de la foi est dans la voie normale de la sainteté. » Ce n'est pas à vrai dire, pour moi, une nouveauté. Dès octobre 1881, étant étudiant de première année en théologie j'entendais leT. R. P. Beaudouin, régent des Études, inaugurant son commentaire sur la IIa Pars par une Relectio sur la Théologie mystique, affirmer avec vigueur l'identité de la IIa Pars avec la Théologie de la mystique : Elle est là tout entière, disait-il, et, pour comprendre les grands mystiques, vous n'aurez jamais besoin de chercher ailleurs. J'ai, depuis lors, travaillé dans le sillon ouvert et n'ai pas eu à m'en repentir. Il n'est pas étonnant que, disciples d'une même tradition, le P. Garrigou-Lagrange et moi, aboutissions à une même conclusion.

Phone Apps for Text-Mobbing Speakers with Textual References at Conferences

I had the pleasure to witness (and to be honest, participate in unwittingly) a relatively-new phenomenon that is an interesting intersection of medieval thought and modern technology: Text-Mobbing.

In olden times (2-3 years ago), an audience member might have a question or helpful thought about the presenter’s claim about or interpretation of a text of St. Thomas Aquinas. But unless one had the encyclopedic knowledge of Thomas’s corpus such as Fr. Lawrence Dewan, O.P. used to demonstrate, the best you could do was make a note of your concern or suggestion, look up the reference upon returning home, and then follow up with the presenter in an e-mail.

Now, however, there are a multitude of useful apps for your phone that give you immediate access to the whole of Thomas’s texts in your hand, so that you can look up and find the relevant Question and Article on the fly. This permits you to immediately direct the speaker’s attention to the text itself in the question and answer period.

When the questions are particularly interesting and/or contentious, however, and multiple audience members have looked up the passages they deem relevant but did not get a chance to share their thoughts, then themoment the polite applause designating the end of the session has ceased, the speaker is approached by a zealous mob with texts in hand, eager to demonstrate their points.

Hence: Text-Mobbing.

The poor speaker is confronted with multiple phones bearing tiny text that they are implored to read, all at once. It is generally polite to enlarge the font of your text, and allow your target to focus his or her eyes on the phone before launching into your argument. And like any other polite conversation, the speaker should be allowed to conclude reading one text before somebody thrusts another phone before their eyes.

As for the sources of these texts, any smartphone, tablet or computer can point its browser to:

http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html

for the Corpus Thomisticum or to the Dominican House of Studies site for Thomas’s texts:

http://dhspriory.org/thomas/

But if your internet connection is spotty or slow, there’s no substitute for having the whole text on your device; for that, I can recommend the following apps:

iPieta (iOS and Android)

https://www.ipieta.com/

Probably the best app I’ve found is iPieta, which has multiple modules that allow you to have Thomas’s Summa Theologiae (Latin and English), Catena Aurea and Compendium of Theology, along with the Fathers of the Church, a plethora of spiritual writings, prayers, daily readings, etc.

STh It (Android)

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=anynet.sqlite.sth.latine

This is the Summa Theologiae from the Corpus Thomisticum, as adapted to the Android OS by by the Polish Dominican Fr Andrzej Nakonieczny. It has the advantage of retaining the indexing from the Corpus Thomisticum, as well as “+” and “-“ buttons to increase or decrease the size of the font with one click.

Microsoft Office Lens

iOS: https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/office-lens/id975925059?mt=8

Android: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.microsoft.office.officelens&hl=en

Office Lens allows you to snap a picture of a sheet of paper and instantly turn it into a PDF with text recognition. This allows you to easily scan the useful handout of the person sitting next to you, when there are not enough copies to go around or if you just want your handouts available electronically for future reference.

The above apps are all available free, and can be immensely useful for finding relevant references during a talk or in polite conversation afterwards.

Common natures in God's mind: A response to Bill Vallicella

Bill Vallicella poses the following problem: 

Consider a time t before there were any human animals and any finite minds, and ask yourself: did the nature humanity exist at t?

Vallicella points out that, for Aquinas, the answer would be that at t humanity existed in God’s mind. He comments on Aquinas’s answer thus:

This may seem to solve the problem I raised.  Common natures are not nothing because they are divine accusatives.  And they are not nothing in virtue of being ausserseiend. This solution avoids the three options of Platonism, subjectivism (according to which CNs exist only as products of abstraction), and Meinongianism.

What Vallicella is talking about here, of course, is Aquinas's doctrine of divine ideas. But he isn’t satisfied with the solution this doctrine offers.

The problem with the solution is that it smacks of deus ex machina: God is brought in to solve the problem similarly as Descartes had recourse to the divine veracity to solve the problem of the external world.  Solutions to the problems of universals, predication, and intentionality ought to be possible without bringing God into the picture.

I don’t see any reason to concede this deus ex machina (DEM) objection against Aquinas's doctrine. Why ought solutions to the problems of universals, predication, and intentionality to be possible without bringing God into the picture? Vallicella doesn’t say.  What if I instructed you in the following way: “Solve the problem of human knowledge without appealing to an immaterial intellect”? You could legitimately ask why I’ve barred the path of inquiry in this way. What if our reflection on the evidence indicated that an immaterial intellect had to be a part of the solution? (If you’re a naturalist, suppose I tell you to solve the problem of human knowledge without appealing to the brain.) Vallicella needs to explain why God can’t be involved in the solution of the above problems.

Vallicella references an earlier post where he considers what’s wrong with arguments that rely on a DEM. Let's look at this post to see if we can find out why he wishes to object to Aquinas in the way he does.

Vallicella suggests in this post five possible ways to understand what is meant by the DEM charge when it is leveled in philosophy. Vallicella’s DEM catalogue, however tentative, is very useful and appears to fill in a gap in the literature. Here are the possibilities he proposes:

(1) Any appeal to a supernatural agent in a theory of natural phenomena is a DEM.

(2)  An appeal to a supernatural agent in a theory of natural phenomena is a DEM iff no independent reasons are given for the existence of the supernatural agent.

(3)  An appeal to a supernatural agent in a theory of natural phenomena is a DEM iff no reasons are supplied for the existence of the divine agent.

(4)  An appeal to a supernatural agent in a theory of natural phenomena is a DEM iff EITHER no reasons are supplied for the existence of the divine agent, OR the working of the agent violates natural laws.

(5)  An appeal to a supernatural agent in a theory of natural phenomena is a DEM iff EITHER no reasons are supplied for the existence of the divine agent, OR the working of the agent violates natural laws, OR the agent’s intervention in nature is miraculous in the sense in that it takes over a job that ought to be done by a natural entity.

Vallicella doesn’t think we should a priori rule out arguments to God as the cause of natural phenomena. So, he says that (1) can’t be what a DEM is. (Actually, he doesn't argue exactly like this but this is how I interpret him.)

Vallicella also concludes that (2) can’t be what a DEM is. Here's how he explains its flaw:

Why would the reasons for the supernatural agent have to be independent, i.e., independent of the job the agent is supposed to do? Suppose the appeal to a divine agent takes the form of an inference to the best or the only possible explanation of the natural explananda. Then the appeal to the divine agent would be rationally justified despite the fact that the agent is posited to do a specific job.

I’m not quite sure what Vallicella’s view of (3) is. He seems to think that it constitutes a DEM but isn't the only form it can take. It can also take the form of (4) and (5).

But if we construe DEM as (3), (4), or (5), Aquinas's doctrine of divine ideas isn't conspicuously guilty of DEM. Aquinas doesn't fail to offer reasons for the existence of the divine agent whose mind contains the ideas (cf. ST, Ia, 2, 3). There is no obvious way that the doctrine of divine ideas violates natural laws (presumably the laws of the physical world that the natural sciences investigate). And, finally, it doesn't give a job to God that ought to be done by a natural entity.

With respect to the last point, Aquinas takes the divine ideas to be God's understanding of his essence as imitable by any creature (cf. ST, Ia, 15, 2). No natural entity as such could have God's understanding of his essence. Ergo, God isn't doing a job some natural entity should do, for no natural entity could do it.

So, I'm perplexed by Vallicella's suggestion that Aquinas's doctrine of divine ideas is an instance of DEM.

Vallicella is a careful, sharp thinker, so I assume that I have misunderstood him or he has only incompletely expressed himself. It’s possible that we do simply disagree but I suspect that the point of disagreement has not yet been identified.

Objective and Subjective Sin

Does anybody know where and when the widespread use of the distinction between objective and subjective sin was introduced?  I can find plenty of medieval and modern distinction between perfect and imperfect acts, and between human and non-human acts.  For instance, there is a lot on how somebody who sleeps with another's wife does not commit adultery if he does not know that she is married to another.  But I can't find anything about how someone who knowing sleeps with another's wife might not really be committing adultery.  There has to be something in the literature.  I have seen several statements like "The Church teaches that adultery is objectively wrong, but not always subjectively sinful."  I can see why it might not be sinful if it is not formally adultery, but I don't think that this is what they are saying.

I've looked around a bit in different descriptions of why we shouldn't judge others.  There are obvious remarks on how it is not our place, how we lack the relevant knowledge, etc.  It is like one servant judging another.  There is also material on how we might not know circumstances that would mitigate or change the act.  But most medieval and early modern authors seem to assume that if someone knowingly murders or commits adultery, we can know that they sinned mortally.  Augustine states that we should then reflect on the fact that they might repent, and we might be damned, etc.  The general approach seems to involve a combination of some of at least four elements: 1) don't judge if you don't need to because it is not your place, 2) you cannot know all the relevant circumstances, especially of acts that are not intrinsically evil, 3) even if you know that the neighbor's act is mortally sinful, you don't know if it is merely on account of weakness or ignorance instead of malice, and 4) you don't know that the person will repent and become a great saint, whereas you might be damned.  I don't find any suggestions that we should consider that our neighbor is not in fact sinning by committing adultery, blasphemy, or murder.  In other words, nobody says, "You can know that your neighbor is choosing to commit objectively evil actions such as murder or blasphemy, but you can't know that he is subjectively guilty."  Where does this come from historically?  Please send an e-mail or comment if you have citations from before the twentieth century that don't have to do with the formal/material distinction, or even if you know of anything that suggests the possibility of invincible ignorance concerning the substance of the Ten Commandments.

Amoris Laetitia: Misquoting St. Thomas on Rules

There is another misuse of St. Thomas, this time on rules.  It is in a section called "Rules and Discernment."

The document quotes Thomas to justify exceptions to"rules," as if the natural law concerning sexual relations did not involve exceptionless negative precepts.  The document lacks a basic understanding of Thomas's view of how rules are applied to particular situations.  

Consider this quote: 304.
It is reductive simply to consider whether or not an individual’s actions correspond to a general law or rule, because that is not enough to discern and ensure full fidelity to God in the concrete life of a human being. I earnestly ask that we always recall a teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas and learn to incorporate it in our pastoral discernment: “Although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects… In matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles; and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all… The principle will be found to fail, according as we descend further into detail”.347 It is true that general rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected, but in their formulation they cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations. At the same time, it must be said that, precisely for that reason, what is part of a practical discernment in particular circumstances cannot be elevated to the level of a rule. That would not only lead to an intolerable casuistry, but would endanger the very values which must be preserved with special care.

347 Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 94, art. 4.

The document seems to conflate rules such as "You shalt not commit adultery" with rules such as "Return borrowed items."  But consider this statement: "It is true that general rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected, but in their formulation they cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations."  In this case it seems to confuse rules such as "You shall not commit adultery" or "You shall not murder" with rules such as "Love God," "Help others, "Give alms."   I first thought that the passage was discussing primary and secondary precepts.  But then it seems to be discussing the difference between rules that oblige semper and ad semper and those that oblige semper and not ad semper.  Which does it mean?  And how are either relevant to the issue at hand?

For clarifying these issues, it is might be helpful to look at a good book on Moral Philosophy, such as Ralph McInerny's Ethica Thomistica.  
 

Amoris Laetitia: Misquoting St. Thomas on Irregular Relationships?

There is an interesting quote from St. Thomas in the new exhortation Amoris Laetitia.  Unless I am mistaken, it follows the trend of much neo-Modernist "scholarship" by misquoting St. Thomas in favor of a political or religious goal.  Thomas discusses the difficulty that some saints have in spite of their virtuous habits.  It seems to be used in the exhortation as evidence that those who commit reproductive acts in irregular situations might not be guilty of mortal sin.  I have no idea what sort of argument or interpretation might cause one to interpret Thomas's comments in favor of this view.  Apart from what the document actually says, there seems to be an egregious misuse of St. Thomas. 

Here is the passage:

 For an adequate understanding of the possibility and need of special discernment in certain “irregular” situations, one thing must always be taken into account, lest anyone think that the demands of the Gospel are in any way being compromised. The Church possesses a solid body of reflection concerning mitigating factors and situations. Hence it is can no longer simply be said that all those in any “irregular” situation are living in a state of mortal sin and are deprived of sanctifying grace. More is involved here than mere ignorance of the rule. A subject may know full well the rule, yet have great difficulty in understanding “its inherent values”,339 or be in a concrete situation which does not allow him or her to act differently and decide otherwise without further sin. As the Synod Fathers put it, “factors may exist which limit the ability to make a decision”.340 Saint Thomas Aquinas himself recognized that someone may possess grace and charity, yet not be able to exercise any one of the virtues well;341 in other words, although someone may possess all the infused moral virtues, he does not clearly manifest the existence of one of them, because the outward practice of that virtue is rendered difficult: “Certain saints are said not to possess certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, even though they have the habits of all the virtues”.342

 341 Cf. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 65, art. 3 ad 2; De Malo, q. 2, art. 2.

342 Ibid., ad 3.

The quotes from St. Thomas have nothing to do with the issue under discussion, and seem to be merely manipulated to support a very different position.   Apart from any religious reservations a believer might have about the paragraph, Thomists should be very worried about the misuse of Thomas's texts for political and religious reasons.

I am willing to believe or at least accept anything in such documents that is not obviously wrong.  But the use of St. Thomas in this passage is embarrassing.  Or am I missing something?

ADDITIONAL BUT ONLY PARTLY RELATED COMMENT

Incidentally, is this document claiming that Christians can be sometimes be free of guilt on account of invincible ignorance of the Ten Commandments?  I have seen this in some recent preaching and writers, but not so clearly in other official documents, and never (or almost never) before the twentieth century.     There is an isolated passage from St. Thomas that some have argued proves that there can be invincible ignorance of fornication (De Malo, q. 3, art. 8).  But here he has not yet described the different kinds of voluntary and involuntary ignorance, and is merely distinguishing between ignorance concerning the deformity of the act (such as ignorance that fornication is a sin), and ignorance of the circumstances, (such as that someone is not one's wife).  Interpreting this article as in favor of invincible ignorance of fornication at least seems to conflict with other passages such as:  De Veritate, q. 17, art. 3; l I-II, q. 6, art. 8; I-II, q. 19, art. 5-6;  I-II, q. 77, art. 7, ad 2. But the exhortation seems to be stretching this invincible ignorance to Catholics, and to adultery.