Amoris Laetitia: Misquoting St. Thomas on Rules

There is another misuse of St. Thomas, this time on rules.  It is in a section called "Rules and Discernment."

The document quotes Thomas to justify exceptions to"rules," as if the natural law concerning sexual relations did not involve exceptionless negative precepts.  The document lacks a basic understanding of Thomas's view of how rules are applied to particular situations.  

Consider this quote: 304.
It is reductive simply to consider whether or not an individual’s actions correspond to a general law or rule, because that is not enough to discern and ensure full fidelity to God in the concrete life of a human being. I earnestly ask that we always recall a teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas and learn to incorporate it in our pastoral discernment: “Although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects… In matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles; and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all… The principle will be found to fail, according as we descend further into detail”.347 It is true that general rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected, but in their formulation they cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations. At the same time, it must be said that, precisely for that reason, what is part of a practical discernment in particular circumstances cannot be elevated to the level of a rule. That would not only lead to an intolerable casuistry, but would endanger the very values which must be preserved with special care.

347 Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 94, art. 4.

The document seems to conflate rules such as "You shalt not commit adultery" with rules such as "Return borrowed items."  But consider this statement: "It is true that general rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected, but in their formulation they cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations."  In this case it seems to confuse rules such as "You shall not commit adultery" or "You shall not murder" with rules such as "Love God," "Help others, "Give alms."   I first thought that the passage was discussing primary and secondary precepts.  But then it seems to be discussing the difference between rules that oblige semper and ad semper and those that oblige semper and not ad semper.  Which does it mean?  And how are either relevant to the issue at hand?

For clarifying these issues, it is might be helpful to look at a good book on Moral Philosophy, such as Ralph McInerny's Ethica Thomistica.  
 

Amoris Laetitia: Misquoting St. Thomas on Irregular Relationships?

There is an interesting quote from St. Thomas in the new exhortation Amoris Laetitia.  Unless I am mistaken, it follows the trend of much neo-Modernist "scholarship" by misquoting St. Thomas in favor of a political or religious goal.  Thomas discusses the difficulty that some saints have in spite of their virtuous habits.  It seems to be used in the exhortation as evidence that those who commit reproductive acts in irregular situations might not be guilty of mortal sin.  I have no idea what sort of argument or interpretation might cause one to interpret Thomas's comments in favor of this view.  Apart from what the document actually says, there seems to be an egregious misuse of St. Thomas. 

Here is the passage:

 For an adequate understanding of the possibility and need of special discernment in certain “irregular” situations, one thing must always be taken into account, lest anyone think that the demands of the Gospel are in any way being compromised. The Church possesses a solid body of reflection concerning mitigating factors and situations. Hence it is can no longer simply be said that all those in any “irregular” situation are living in a state of mortal sin and are deprived of sanctifying grace. More is involved here than mere ignorance of the rule. A subject may know full well the rule, yet have great difficulty in understanding “its inherent values”,339 or be in a concrete situation which does not allow him or her to act differently and decide otherwise without further sin. As the Synod Fathers put it, “factors may exist which limit the ability to make a decision”.340 Saint Thomas Aquinas himself recognized that someone may possess grace and charity, yet not be able to exercise any one of the virtues well;341 in other words, although someone may possess all the infused moral virtues, he does not clearly manifest the existence of one of them, because the outward practice of that virtue is rendered difficult: “Certain saints are said not to possess certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, even though they have the habits of all the virtues”.342

 341 Cf. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 65, art. 3 ad 2; De Malo, q. 2, art. 2.

342 Ibid., ad 3.

The quotes from St. Thomas have nothing to do with the issue under discussion, and seem to be merely manipulated to support a very different position.   Apart from any religious reservations a believer might have about the paragraph, Thomists should be very worried about the misuse of Thomas's texts for political and religious reasons.

I am willing to believe or at least accept anything in such documents that is not obviously wrong.  But the use of St. Thomas in this passage is embarrassing.  Or am I missing something?

ADDITIONAL BUT ONLY PARTLY RELATED COMMENT

Incidentally, is this document claiming that Christians can be sometimes be free of guilt on account of invincible ignorance of the Ten Commandments?  I have seen this in some recent preaching and writers, but not so clearly in other official documents, and never (or almost never) before the twentieth century.     There is an isolated passage from St. Thomas that some have argued proves that there can be invincible ignorance of fornication (De Malo, q. 3, art. 8).  But here he has not yet described the different kinds of voluntary and involuntary ignorance, and is merely distinguishing between ignorance concerning the deformity of the act (such as ignorance that fornication is a sin), and ignorance of the circumstances, (such as that someone is not one's wife).  Interpreting this article as in favor of invincible ignorance of fornication at least seems to conflict with other passages such as:  De Veritate, q. 17, art. 3; l I-II, q. 6, art. 8; I-II, q. 19, art. 5-6;  I-II, q. 77, art. 7, ad 2. But the exhortation seems to be stretching this invincible ignorance to Catholics, and to adultery.

Thomism and Indissolubility of Marriage at Trent

Concerning divorce and remarriage, in addition to the texts cited by Brugger, it is interesting to look at some passing treatments by moral theologians.  Gonet discusses the matter of Pani's article, which is the relation of the Greeks to Trent, sess. 24, can. 7 de matrim, in Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae, vol. 5, tract. 8, disp. 5, art. 3, nn. 61-62 (Antwerp, 1725, p. 530).   This text is available on the PRDL site.

Pruemmer, in his Manuale Theologiae Moralis, Pars II, tract. 10, cap. 3, art. 2, n. 62, notes that some hold that the indissolubitiy of a consummated Christian marriage is certain, it lacks the certitude of faith.  Nevertheless, it is heretical to say that the church errs when it taught and teaches that the bound of marriage cannot be dissolved by the adultery.  Consequently, those who reject the doctrine are at least "in errore proximo haeresi."  He deals with Trent and the Greeks in a footnote. 

Double Standard for Modernist Scholarship?

It seems to me that recently in Catholic intellectual life we have seen in some circles a complete subordination of scholarship to the neo-Modernist agenda.  This subordination is not entirely new, but it seems to me more extreme and explicit.  Two cases stick out: Adriano Oliva's Amours, and Giancarlo Pani's La Civilita Cattolica article on marriage at the Council of Trent.   Again, such a politicization and degradation of scholarship is not entirely new.  Oliva is building on a long tradition of secular politicized scholarship concerning homosexuality, which can be seen in the work of John Boswell, and was reflected in the public shenanigans of Martha Nussbaum ( http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9609/stand.html).  Pani is in part drawing on a twenty-year tradition of neo-Modernist moral theology.

It seems to me that Catholic scholars with neo-Modernist leadings can get away with shoddy work in a way that is similar to how politically-minded scholars generally can get away with such work in the secular context.  Is there an increasing double standard?  I can't think of recent parallel instances where tradition-minded established scholars or respected public intellectuals similarly misuse scholarship or rely on scholarly credentials to further their agenda, but I could very well be wrong.  

I would love comments on the following questions: Is there a double standard?  Are there other instances of it, such as in ecumenical dialogue?  Or is it just the result of my recent reading of Oliva?   

Maybe it is just a lot more common in theology, and I have been reading more theology lately.

For Pani's article, see:

http://www.laciviltacattolica.it/it/quaderni/articolo/3461/matrimonio-e-%C2%ABseconde-nozze%C2%BB-al-concilio-di-trento

and a helpful rejoinder in

http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/10/13934/

Happy feast of St. Thomas Aquinas!

As our readers know, it has become our custom at Thomistica.net to celebrate "both" feasts of St. Thomas Aquinas. January 28 is Aquinas’s liturgical feast according to the General Roman Calendar promulgated by Paul VI in 1969. On that date in 1369 Aquinas’s relics were translated to the Dominican church in Toulouse. March 7 is Aquinas's liturgical feast according to the 1960 General Roman Calendar (and earlier calendars). Aquinas died on that date in 1274 at the abbey of Fossanova, where he had stopped after taking ill on his way with Reginald of Piperno to the second Council of Lyons.

From the oratio secreta of the feast day Mass of the 1962 Missal:

Sancti Thomae Confessoris tui atque Doctoris nobis, Domine, pia non desit oratio: quae et munera nostra conciliet; et tuam nobis indulgentiam semper obtineat.

Aquinas's brain in a vat?

Prima facie some people might think that Aquinas’s epistemology is susceptible to the brain in a vat (BIV) objection. Two things could suggest this: (1) Aquinas is a direct realist (in something like John Searle’s sense of the term minus the biologism and perhaps a few other things) and (2) he believes that, for human beings, it is our senses that first put us into cognitive contact with the world (and in which all our subsequent natural knowledge of things is rooted).

But I don’t think that Aquinas really needs to worry about BIVs. He doesn’t need to because nobody needs to, that is, no reasonable person does. But before I tell you why I think this, let’s consider the objection.

If I may, I shall use Hilary Putnam’s formulation of the objection as he presents it in Reason, Truth, and History. Putnam, of course, thinks he has an argument that shows that the BIV objection is self-refuting. I’m not going to adopt Putnam’s argument or evaluate it. I’m just going to use his account of the objection. Here it is:

Imagine that a human being (you can imagine this to be yourself) has been subjected to an operation by an evil scientist. The person's brain (your brain) has been removed from the body and placed in a vat of nutrients which keeps the brain alive. The nerve endings have been connected to a super-scientific computer which causes the person whose brain it is to have the illusion that everything is perfectly normal. There seem to be people, objects, the sky, etc.; but really, all the person (you) is experiencing is the result of electronic impulses travelling from the computer to the nerve endings. The computer is so clever that if the person tries to raise his hand, the feedback from the computer will cause him to “see” and “feel” the hand being raised. Moreover, by varying the program, the evil scientist can cause the victim to “experience” (or hallucinate) any situation or environment the evil scientist wishes. He can also obliterate the memory of the brain operation, so that the victim will seem to himself to have always been in this environment. It can even seem to the victim that he is sitting and reading these very words about the amusing but quite absurd supposition that there is an evil scientist who removes people’s brains from their bodies and places them in a vat of nutrients which keep the brains alive.

Against direct realists like Aquinas, who hold that, in general, our senses reliably deliver an extra mentem world to us, the objection is supposed to show that they can never be certain that this is the case, they can never be certain that such a knowable extra mentem world exists. Cue the dark chuckling of the skeptic.

But why are Aquinas and other direct realists condemned to this uncertainty? I take it that it is essential to the BIV objection that, by hypothesis, there would be no noticeable difference between the worlds experienced by us whether the ontological/epistemic situation is as the direct realist thinks or whether we are BIVs. In other words, in both worlds, things would look exactly the same. This being so, the poor direct realists just can’t say for sure that they aren’t BIVs. And, presumably, they should give up their direct realism or, at the very least, not be too smug about it.

I’m afraid, however, that I’m just not convinced that direct realists should be all that anxious in the face of the BIV objection. The reason why I think this way is easy to state. According to the hypothesis, you could never have any evidence that you are a BIV, for if you did, you could know you were a BIV. You might understand that it is a logical possibility, but it is a logical possibility for which you have zero evidence and (again, according to the hypothesis) never could have any evidence. In the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume tells us that “[a] wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence.” Who could disagree? But if I should proportion my belief to the evidence, then I should never take seriously the proposal that I am a BIV. And if I am a direct realist, I should never give up my direct realism because of it.

Consider an analogous case. The controversy over Shakespeare’s real identity is well-known. It seems to me to be logically possible that the real Shakespeare is a Norwegian playwright who became proficient in English. But suppose no evidence ever turns up that suggests that this is more than a logical possibility. Without any evidence, the Shakespeare scholar who takes the Norwegian possibility seriously is a perfect fool.

Aquinas and other direct realists need not worry about BIVs (nor need anybody else).

Current Events Almost Prove Thomistic Thesis

In the recent excitement over the Pope's recently reported comments on the plane, nobody has noted a perhaps more interesting but less practical point, which is that, if Fr. Lombardi is correct, a historical event has tilted a scholastic debate. 

I am taking the formulation from the Collegium Salmanticensis, C.T., De Fide, Dips. 4, dub. 1, nn. 5-7 (Palme, vol. 11, pp. 250-252).

The question: An Pontifex ut Doctor particularis gaudeat eadem indefectibilitate circa res Fidei, et an possit absolute errare circa objecta secunda generis, quae supra descripsimus?

Albertus Pighius was thought to be the first to hold this position, although others such as Bellarmine and Suarez responded negatively as well, at least with respect to errors concerning things of faith, and "cum contumacia."

The Carmelites and Banez (as well as the preceding tradition?) hold that Summus Pontifex ut doctor particularis potest errare non solum circa objecta secundi generis, sed etiam circa res fidei, et non solum errore inculpabili proveniente ex ignorantia, aut negligentia, sed etiam cum contumacia, ita ut sit haereticus.

With respect to the kinds of objects,  "Pontifex ad duo objectorum genera comparari valet: ad res fidei, ad bonos Ecclesiae mores, aliaque hujusmodi, quae pertinent ad commune ovium sibi creditarum salutem."  The others concern the faith in some other way.

The plane conference was ut doctor particularis.  If Fr. Lombardi is correct, it also involved matters belonging to the first category (grave matter).  Consequently, the second opinion would be proved up to the point "non solum circa objecta secondi generis," but NOT from "et non solum errore . . ."   Could this be right?

2/29/2016 Response to Comment

It is clear to me that the position that Fr. Lombardi attributes to the Pope would qualify with respect to its content, but it is perhaps uncertain to me that the Pope really said it, or, if he did, whether he holds it cum contumacia.  As was discussed previously, according to Banez et al., a Pope would not cease being Pope simply by being a heretic.  The legal membership of a Pope or indeed any bishop continues even after they separate themselves through heresy.  There needs to be a trial.  In the case of the Pope, what group could determine this and who would call it.  The old exceptions to the Pope's authority in calling a Council (found in anti-Conciliarist discussions) apply when the Pope is guilty of heresy (or apostasy) or schism.  Examples are Constance and the group in Rome that deposed Pope Marcellinus (whether it happened or not, people thought that it did).  Practically speaking, I don't know how anything like that could work after 1917, but I know nothing of canon law.   With respect to the matter under discussion, I don't see how a watertight case could be made that the conditions exist.  Moreover, I doubt that there is a cadre of good bishops out there ready to defend Catholic teaching against much of the Catholic establishment, including their fellow bishops.  They just aren't there and ready to be controversial.  It is how they have been selected, maybe at least in part for good reason.  It seems clear to me that the teaching on the intrinsic evil of contraceptive acts is necessary for salvation.  But the only ones defending it publicly and loudly have been lay people and priests  (Smith, Brugger, National Catholic Bioethics Center).  Moreover, I haven't heard any episcopal comments on the errors of some of the new non-magisterial documents and statements.  As the recent Synod discussions indicated, there is widespread error concerning "quae pertinent ad commune ovium sibi creditarum salutem." It is like living in the fourth century.  

When is it a duty to correct prelates?

Christian Brugger's piece in the National Catholic Register today brought to mind St. Thomas's statement that "ubi immineret periculum fidei, etiam publice essent praelati a subditis arguendi."  (ST. II-II, q. 3, art. 4, ad 2).  

Has anyone seen reputable discussions of what qualifies as "ubi immineret periculum fidei"?  Or who is obliged to correct?  I can't imagine that everyone would be obliged to correct their bishop and the Pope, even if they were required to privately reject the expressed behavior or position.  Nevertheless, it might apply widely, since, as Thomas says in the response, "correctio fraterna, quae est actus caritatis, pertinet ad unumquemque respectu cuiuslibet personae ad quam caritatem debet habere, si in eo aliquid corrigibile inveniatur."

I am sure that Brugger's behavior is correct.  I am wondering whether it is obligatory on some, and whether it counts as fraternal correction or not.  

Brugger's piece is here: http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/pope-francis-and-contraception-a-troubling-scenario/

New Natural Law Ill Equipped for PRACTICAL Task of Legislation

My thesis question is this: Is it not the case that the New Natural Law approach to the Moral Object is badly suited for the practical task of pro-life legislation? 

All Catholics ought to be pro-life. But the pro-life stance involves the will and the effort to achieve legislation protecting the unborn. This is achieved by laws against abortion.

Now, on the New Natural Law approach, we supposedly don’t know if an act of in-utero-child-death-dealing really is murder, really is abortion, until we ask the agent what her / his intention is. So the NNL approach contends: Only if the agent proposes to himself / herself “I seek the death of the child,” then the act constitutes directly procured abortion and should thus be punishable by law.

But if the agent proposes to himself / herself “I seek only the removal of the child,” then – on this account – the act does not constitute direct abortion but simply “removal of the fetus.”

In the latter case, the New Natural Law analysis does have further questions; chiefly, Is there “proportionate reason” to remove the fetus? If not, the act is not justified. If so, the act is justified. The NNL analysis then submits that if the mother were to die unless the fetus is removed, there is proportionate reason. A fortiori, the argument goes, is there proportionate reason if both mother and fetus were to die unless the fetus is removed.

What is the upshot? The upshot is that on the New Natural Law account, pro-life legislation would require examination of the intention of the agent.

Now, it is notoriously difficult for a human tribunal to discover with moral certitude the intentions of an agent. Sometimes these intentions are shown in evidence. Example: Someone plotting a death in writing leaves evidence of First Degree culpability. But just what would be the way in which one might reliably, for the most part, determine the intention of the agent seeking or providing abortion? What could be done if someone simply claimed to have "proposed" to himself / herself that the action is "removal"? Further, would every abortion provider be examined, after each abortion, concerning what his / her proximate intentions were? 

Clearly, the New Natural Law approach is on this score very ill-suited to practical application. This is ironic, since practical application is one of the leading reasons suggested in defense of NNL. Even some who eschew the theory tolerate it – or donate to its richly endowed foundations - because of its purported applicability, its status as receivable public argument. But here, practical political application seems doomed to a bad fate.

Is this fate not definitional to the NNL approach? For, as Steven Long has argued, NNL denies the basic point that some actions have per se effects and that for any agent intelligently to propose to commit the action just is to propose to bring about these per se effects.

Consequently: Let the money go to the Traditional Natural Law. 

Happy feast of St. Thomas Aquinas

We wish all of our readers a very happy feast of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Separation and the River Forest Debate

The suggestion may be naive. Here 't goes. The debate is well known. Is proof of the existence of a being that cannot be material required before the separatio of being from matter can be achieved? Gilsonians say no; River Forest / Laval Thomism says yes. 

Remark: The Platonists seem to have a valid argument for The One from the many. (Though perhaps someone will dispute this. I find it compelling.) Yet, they reject the predicates "Being" and "Intelligence", etc., for The One. 

Thus, the question: Is it even sufficient to infer The One in order to determine the freedom of some perfection from limitation? 

Thomas Aquinas and Judaism

Anyone interested in “The Gifts and the Calling of God are Irrevocable” might also be interested in Matthew Levering, Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas: http://www.amazon.com/Christs-Fulfillment-Torah-Temple-Salvation/dp/0268022739/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1449846803&sr=8-1&keywords=levering+torah+temple

Unlike the recent non-magisterial document, Thomas's view is based on a sound interpretation of Scripture and Catholic belief.  The document more or less either ignores or sets aside the important distinctions and issues that Thomas addresses.