Cannibalism and Thomism

Does anyone know of any good Thomistic accounts of the cannibalism in the Andes?  See http://www.catholicnews.com/data/movies/08mv177.htm  I see that some bishops said that it was OK, but I haven't seen any sophisticated treatment of it.  I am wondering if some people consider cannibalism maybe as a side issue in some articles on sins against nature or intrinsically evil acts.

Is it Ok to eat meat from an already dead person to save Anne Frank?  This seems to me possibly different from lying or buggering a hen in order to save Anne Frank.

There is a lot on lying and Ann Frank.  For the moral issues involved with hen buggering, see (or even better, don't see)  http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/2001----.htm

 

 

Hitchcock on Semi-Pelagianism as Orthodoxy

James Hitchock's History of the Catholic Church (p. 94) states that semi-Pelagianism "despite its name, in effect came to define Catholic orthodoxy."  I have suspected that many or most "orthodox" Catholics in our dark times are materially semi-Pelagians.  Here is evidence.

On a related note, we seem to be prohibited from calling Molina Semi-Pelagian.  DS 2564 (31 Jul 1748)"The followers of Molina and Suarez are condemned by their adversaries as Semi-Pelagians. But the Roman Pontiffs have not passed judgment on the Molinist system, which they [followers of Molina and Suarez] presently defend and may continue to do so. "

Happy Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas!

January 28 is Aquinas’s liturgical feast according to the General Roman Calendar promulgated by Paul VI in 1969. On that date in 1369 Aquinas’s relics were translated to the Dominican church in Toulouse.

March 7 is Aquinas's liturgical feast according to the 1960 General Roman Calendar (and earlier calendars). Aquinas died on that date in 1274 at the abbey of Fossanova, where he had stopped after taking ill on his way with Reginald of Piperno to the second Council of Lyons.

The 1960 and 1969 calendars are still in force in the Roman Rite. The first applies to the so-called Extraordinary Form of the Roman Rite and the second applies to the so-called Ordinary Form. So, we celebrate Aquinas's feast twice.

Four Catholic Journals Indulge in Doctrinal Solipsism

Four Catholic journals--the National Catholic Register,  America, The National Catholic Reporter, and Our Sunday Visitor--have decided to press for the total abolition of the death penalty in the United States in a shared editorial, making only faintly veiled suggestions that it is essentially evil, "abhorrent".  Their joint editorial may be found, among other places, here. The editorial manifests a wondrously positivistic indifference to, and disregard for, distinctions in doctrine.  That all the Doctors and Fathers of the Church--with the exception of Tertullian who died outside the faith-- have taught the essential validity of capital punishment; and that it is the teaching of the Council of Trent that where all the Fathers and Doctors hold one interpretation of Scripture as the proper one, Catholics are to accept it, are two propositions that signify very little in the oppressive culture of mutationist accounts of doctrinal development.  

Wholly unobserved is the high theological note characterizing the profession required of the Waldensians in 1210 in order to re-establish ecclesial communion.  The Waldensians were required to acknowledge among other things the essential justice of the death penalty for grave crime.  Cf. Denzinger, #425—“Concerning secular power we declare that without mortal sin it is possible to exercise a judgment of blood as long as one proceeds to bring punishment not in hatred but in judgment, not incautiously but advisedly.”  Clearly to require this oath for the re-establishment of ecclesial communion at one moment, and then to imply the absolute necessity of the opposite—where what is at stake is not prudential application and limit but the principled possibility of just penalty of death—would constitute not a development of doctrine, but rather a mutation.  Note, again, that the oath required of the Waldensians directly refers to the death penalty in principle and that it indicates that as such it cannot be a malum in se. Nor is it listed as such in Evangelium Vitae, which provides a list of such intrinsic evils from which the death penalty is omitted. 

Are the editors of the journals involved--or the bishops who so commonly describe the death penalty as contrary to human dignity as though it were a malum in se--familiar with the work of the late Eminence Cardinal Avery Dulles on this question?  Or the teaching of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church?  Hundreds of years of Catholic teaching in conformity with the teaching of the Fathers and Doctors has acknowledged that implementing the penalty is a prudential matter and that the penalty is essentially valid.  Pope Piux XII taught that the penalty is valid across cultures.  The wisdom of applying this penalty is essentially a prudential matter.  But as prudential there is no such thing as "de facto abolition" since circumstances change, and--again, contrary to the journals and the new enthusiasm--deterrence is a necessary and essential part of criminal justice.  The reason for this last is that we are not free to impose penalties in this life without considering the common good, and an essential part of this consideration is (contrary to Kant who thought that the justice of the death penalty made its application to be absolutely necessary) the issue of deterrence.  The same place at different times may require different penalties; and different places at the same time may require different penalties.  Many penalties might be essentially just that in particular circumstances do not conduce to the common good and so ought not be applied. Thus it is altogether fitting that--given the overriding circumstance of the rejection of higher law and the widespread determining circumstance of the culture of death--there be a prudential reservation in applying this penalty.  But this is an entirely different thing from the joint editorial's barely concealed anathematization of the penalty, which itself proceeds from a failure to understand, and a lack of due theological regard for, the transcendence of the common good.  

The editorializing journals fail to understand that Evangelium Vitae does not reduce penalty to defense, but adverts to defense largely because of the failure of states to subject themselves to higher law and to acknowledge their subjection to the common good,  In the presence of the widespread circumstance of the failure of the penalty to manifest a transcendent norm of justice owing to the omnipresent culture of death, the other medicinal aspects of penalty--in particular deterrence (which includes keeping the particular criminal from killing again)--become even more important inasmuch as the major medicinal purpose of punishment (manifesting a transcendent norm of justice) is impeded. Yet the journals fail to acknowledge that deterrence is essential to criminal justice, a remarkable view simply contrary to Catholic tradition. But we are not free to impose penalty without care for the common good, and the consideration of deterrence is part of such care. Enthusiasm suppresses such distinctions. 

The journals use the language of "violence" to describe the penalty.  But just penalty does not "violate" the rights of the guilty.  And there is no absolute "right" of the guilty to immunity from justice for grave crime.  It may be better not to impose some penalties, and this is largely true of the death penalty today.  But contrary to the formulations of the journals in question it is precisely not a universal truth, nor is the penalty as such "abhorrent".  That is the language of the Waldensians, language which they were required to renounce to re-establish ecclesial communion with the Roman Catholic Church.  Those who embrace such language should realize that they are crossing over from the Church's prudential reservations regarding the penalty--which then-Cardinal Ratzinger as prefect of the CDF insisted that no Roman Catholic was obligated to share--toward assumption of the Waldensian view of the matter (prior to their return to the Church, that is).  

 Emeritus Pope Benedict the XVI, in a letter to the Cardinal McCarrick in 2004 when he was merely His Eminence Cardinal Ratzinger and prefect of the CDF, made it very clear that the death penalty was not an intrinsic evil and ought not be depicted as one. Indeed, he made clear that regarding the death penalty, questions of war and peace, and so on, laymen had a just claim to exercise their prudential judgment and that disagreement among Catholics on such issues ought not be compared to dissent on matters such as abortion and euthanasia.The letter of then-Cardinal Ratzinger may be found here.  To quote it:

"Not all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and euthanasia. For example, if a Catholic were to be at odds with the Holy Father on the application of capital punishment or on the decision to wage war, he would not for that reason be considered unworthy to present himself to receive Holy Communion. While the Church exhorts civil authorities to seek peace, not war, and to exercise discretion and mercy in imposing punishment on criminals, it may still be permissible to take up arms to repel an aggressor or to have recourse to capital punishment. There may be a legitimate diversity of opinion even among Catholics about waging war and applying the death penalty, but not however with regard to abortion and euthanasia."

One can understand how these points seem not to matter, however, in a doctrinal climate in which what matters is rhetorical posturing to catch progressive winds rather than doctrinal rectitude.  The journals take a general prudential inflection of the Church and, with an impatient spasm of imprudence, describe the penalty as an evil in itself--"abhorrent".  The seeming willingness of some in the Church to entertain any change that may be marketed as "progressive" is certainly a factor in the development of such an attitude. The market for mutationist views of doctrinal development--for the proposition that the Church can absolutely contradict what it has solemnly proclaimed as true, whether about contraception, or abortion, or capital punishment--is a growing market in the antinomian first world.

The difficult issue of the death penalty will remain with us, because penalties are determinationes, determinations of prudence in the light of the common goodThe death penalty is not essentially unjust, and circumstances change.  The threat of Islamist terror was largely invisible at the time of the composition of Evangelium Vitae. It is not impossible that in the future the use of the penalty may be required.  Surely there is no warrant to be found in either the recorded words of Christ, or the teaching of the Fathers and Doctors, for the proposition that the death penalty is "abhorrent".  But then, these authoritative sources are seldom matter for Media Carnival and immediate popularity.  

Need one observe that the journals'  appeal for the US Supreme Court further to ignore the US Constitution will have further implications for the deterioration of our legal system?  The founders, who provide for the death penalty in the US Constitution, cannot coherently be thought to have promulgated in that document anything that could warrant the judgment that it is of its nature "abhorrent" or inconsistent with legal justice.  Thus the journals' insistence that the court once more ignore the Constitution seems to imply a memory lapse that normative reference to that document in its integrity is necessary to several ongoing legal cases of Catholic institutions attempting to preserve their just right to operate as such without being coerced to cooperate in triggering financing for essentially vicious action.  The four journals that published this editorial would have done better to join in a statement defending these endangered institutions.  Certainly urging the US Supreme Court toward further deconstruction of the US Constitution serves neither the just interests of the common good nor the evangelical mission and liberty of the Roman Catholic Church.  

The journals publishing the shared editorial achieve an apotheosis of that special mix of enthusiasm, ignorance of doctrine, distinerest in distinction, and willingness to speak with "abhorrent" rhetoric to prove their wholeheartedness, which are part of the legacy of the sixties.  When in doubt, always amp up the rhetoric and suggest that those who differ with you are guilty of being bloodthirsty.  That is the true path of dialogue.  "All we are saying, is give doctrinal antinomianism a chance."  But: it has had its destructive chance, and we are still reeling from the damage.  The misbegotten application of categories of speech appropriate in regard to the murder of innocents to the vastly different application of just penalty for grave evil, is symptomatic of a society that can garner more support to spare the guilty than to save the innocent.  The crowd still wants Barrabas.

Happy Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas

Today, January 28, is the feast of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Roman Rite according to the calendar of Paul VI. This is the collect from the Mass for the feast:

Deus, qui beátum Thomam sanctitátis zelo ac sacræ doctrínæ stúdio conspícuum effecísti, da nobis, qu æsumus, et quæ dócuit intelléctu conspícere, et quæ gessit imitatióne complére.

Happy feast day!

Thomas on the Exorcisms of King Solomon

I'm working on an NEH grant project, annotating the first complete translation of Book IV of Thomas's Commentary on the Sentences.  I recently came across an odd passage and wanted to know if readers might have any clue where Thomas picked up his knowledge of this extra-biblical aspect of King Solomon:

"Sed contra, exorcismi Salomonis habebant aliquem effectum ad pellendos daemones. Ergo multo fortius exorcismi ecclesiae." (In IV Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 3, qa. 2, sc 2)

There is one other reference, as far as I can tell: De Potentia, q. 6, a. 10, obj. 3:

"It is related of Solomon that he performed certain exercises and thereby compelled the demons to quit bodies that were obsessed by them. Therefore demons can be compelled by adjuration."

To which he replies:

"If Solomon performed these exorcisms when he was in a state of grace, they could derive the power to compel the demons from the power of God. But if it was after he had turned to the worship of idols, so that we have to understand that he performed them by magic arts, these exorcisms had no power to compel the demons, except in the manner explained above."

There is a pseudepigraphical work (usually dated between the 1st to 5th cent. AD) called The Testament of Solomon which refers to the king commanding demons to help him build the Temple, but it's hard for me to imagine Thomas knowing this work, and his comments don't seem to fit with it.

Any suggestions?

John Lamont on anti-Thomism

John Lamont has a provocative piece at Rorate Caeli on the anti-Thomism of the nouvelle théologie. It is somewhat geared toward a popular audience but I believe Thomists, Aquinas scholars, and historians of 20th century Catholic theology (among others) will find it interesting. Lamont returns to some of the themes that he dealt with in a 2008 article he wrote for The Thomist entitled "Determining the Content and Degree of Authority of Church Teachings."

There are three points in particular that Lamont addresses (both in The Thomist article and in the new piece) that I think deserve wider discussion: (1) the truth/falsity of the theses of the "neomodernism" of the nouvelle théologie; (2) the validity (or lack thereof) of the nouvel théologiens' critique of Thomism; (3) the positive/negative influence of the nouvelle théologie on contemporary Catholic thought. All three, of course, require not only historical but also speculative consideration.

Scholastic metaphysics: an interview with Edward Feser on his new book

This past spring Edward Feser's latest book, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, was published by Editiones Scholasticae. We recently talked with Ed about his new book.

***

Thomistica.net: Could you tell us something about the genesis of your book and what your aims are in it?

Feser: One of the aims of the book is to provide, for readers with a background in contemporary analytic philosophy, an exposition and defense of Scholastic (and especially Thomistic) approaches to causation, substance, essence, teleology, identity, persistence, and other issues in fundamental metaphysics.  Another aim is to provide, for readers with a background in Scholastic thought, an introduction to the many ideas and arguments in contemporary analytic philosophy which recapitulate themes in Scholastic metaphysics.  So, the book argues for the continuing relevance and defensibility of Scholastic ideas by revealing how much common conceptual ground already exists between Scholastics and analytic philosophers.

I did a bit of this in earlier work, such as the second chapter of my book Aquinas, but the subject really demanded a book-length treatment.  There is also the consideration that many of the most important arguments for the contemporary relevance of various Scholastic metaphysical ideas are scattered in various books and journal articles by a diverse group of writers -- “analytical Thomists,” Thomists and other Scholastics of a more traditional stripe, scholars who approach the subject from more of a historical perspective, older Neo-Scholastic authors of now out-of-print manuals, and so forth.  There is an urgent need for a convenient resource that gathers the main ideas all together and presents them systematically for philosophers, theologians, and other readers interested in Scholastic metaphysics and its contemporary relevance.  So the book aims to provide that.

The book is in that way somewhat like the old Neo-Scholastic manuals, though of course more up to date in the sense that it engages heavily with the literature in contemporary analytic philosophy.  My friend Bill Vallicella has already taken to referring to the book as “Feser’s manual,” and I’m happy to own the label.

But I should, I suppose, add that I use the term “metaphysics” a little more broadly than some Aristotelians and Thomists do.  Thomists in recent decades have distinguished those questions that are strictly metaphysical from those that fall within the philosophy of nature, though they recognize that there is some overlap.  They are right to make this distinction, but unfortunately it is lost on a lot of contemporary analytic philosophers, who tend to use the term “metaphysics” in a way that often includes topics that the Thomist would see as part of the philosophy of nature (such as the hylemorphic structure of material substances).

To make the book as useful as possible for furthering discussion between analytic philosophers and Scholastics, I have to some extent made allowances for this broader usage in the choice of topics I cover in the book.  But only to an extent.  I plan to follow this book up with a book on Aristotelian philosophy of nature that covers issues that I judged were too far from general metaphysics to be properly treated in the present book -- topics concerning the general structure of time and space, chemical and biological kinds, and so forth.

Thomistica.net: Who is the audience of Scholastic Metaphysics?

Feser: Well, for one thing, and as I’ve indicated, the book is of course aimed at both analytic philosophers and Scholastics interested in questions of fundamental metaphysics.  But I hope it will also find an audience among philosophers interested in natural theology, philosophy of mind, and other sub-disciplines within philosophy, even ethics.  Certainly the key arguments in all these areas made by Thomists and other Scholastics cannot properly be understood or evaluated without an understanding and evaluation of the underlying metaphysics.  Hence you cannot understand Thomistic arguments for God’s existence without an understanding of the theory of act and potency and the other aspects of Scholastic thinking about the nature of causality.  You cannot understand Thomistic arguments concerning the mind-body problem and other aspects of philosophical anthropology without an understanding of hylemorphism.  You cannot understand traditional natural law arguments without an understanding of how Scholastic writers understand teleology (as opposed to the caricatures of their understanding of teleology, which is all that many people are familiar with).  And so forth.

So, while the book doesn’t really say much about these specific sub-disciplines, it is clearly relevant to them.  Indeed, I like to think it would be of interest to anyone concerned with questions about the most general structure of reality and questions about ultimate explanation  -- which includes scientists as well as philosophers -- because that is, of course, what metaphysics is all about.  Metaphysics is the most fundamental of all disciplines.  That is the traditional view, anyway, and it is one I try to vindicate in the book.

Thomistica.net: At one time volumes of scholastic metaphysics were published quite regularly. Now they appear only rarely. The decline seems to have begun in the late 1960s. What do you think are the reasons for this decline?

Feser: That’s a large question, of course.  In part it is linked to the general collapse of traditional theology, philosophy, and catechesis within the Catholic Church and Catholic higher education over the last 40 or 50 years.  Scholastic metaphysics got swept away along with the rest of it.  In part it has to do with the alleged foibles of the textbooks that were so widely in use in the period prior to Vatican II.  The usual complaint against them is that they are dry, merely repeat each other, are somehow untrue to authentic Thomism, etc.   Accusations of “Wolffian rationalism,” “sawdust Thomism,” and other such epithets are routinely flung at them.

I think this is mostly nonsense.  Naturally, like any body of literature, not all the old manuals are of equal quality.  Like anything human, they have their imperfections.  But the standard objections are just ridiculously overstated, and there is some truly excellent and useful work to be found in many of those old books from the late nineteenth centuries through to the early 1960s.  I think we are much the poorer for having let it all slip down the memory hole.  Indeed, we’re paying a heavy price for it.  If you want to know why theology is in such a mess today and secularism in such a position of strength, I would say that it has in large part to do with the fact that Catholic intellectuals have largely lost the intellectual muscle that Scholasticism used to provide.

It is amazing how thoughtlessly people repeat the clichés about the manuals, including people who should know better.  More than once I’ve had people tell me, to my face and pretty much in the same breath, both how much they like my work and how bad the old manuals are -- evidently without noting the cognitive dissonance!   I hope my work will contribute in its own small way to reviving respect for and attention to what the manualists were trying to accomplish.

Thomistica.net: How would you compare your book to some of the older ones, like, say, Klubertanz's Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, or even a recent one like Clarke's The One and the Many? What does your book have in common with them? What would you say is different about your book?

Feser: What it has in common with them is that it treats most of the same issues, in the same sort of systematic way, and defends similar conclusions.  It differs in three major ways.  First, and as I have indicated, it interacts heavily with contemporary analytic philosophy.  That is the tradition I was trained in, and I tend to think that, for all its real weaknesses, the analytic tradition is ripe for fruitful engagement with Scholasticism.  Like Scholastic writers, analytic philosophers emphasize conceptual precision, clarity of expression, and rigorous argumentation.  Recent years have also seen a serious revival of interest in metaphysics within analytic philosophy, including an interest in Aristotelian themes in metaphysics.  There are of course other contemporary philosophers bringing the two traditions into conversation -- David Oderberg’s book Real Essentialism is outstanding in this regard -- but much more needs to be done, and my book aims to further that conversation.

Second, there are differences in the way I would understand some common Thomistic ideas.  For example, I’m not as keen on personalism as Fr. Clarke was.  Having said that, I have enormous respect for Fr. Clarke’s work and have profited much from it.

Third, for the most part my book does not deal directly with issues in natural theology, as older Scholastic books on metaphysics tend to.  In part this is because I have treated these issues elsewhere, such as in my book Aquinas.  In part it is because the book is long enough as it is, and to treat topics in natural theology adequately would in any case require a book of its own.  And in part it is because it is important to emphasize that the key ideas and arguments in Scholastic metaphysics are defensible and important whatever one thinks of their application within natural theology.

Thomistica.net: How has your book been received?

Feser: So far, very well.  It’s gotten several good reviews, including one in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.  It has twice sold out at Amazon.com, once not long after it was first published, and the other time after several reviews appeared at around the same time.  For a while at Amazon, it was trading the #1 spot in Metaphysics with Sartre’s Being and Nothingness.  Not that I checked it daily or anything.  (And of course, reaching the #1 spot in metaphysics for a few days or weeks doesn’t exactly get you into Stephen King bestseller territory!)

The most vigorous and interesting criticism has come from Scotists who think I haven’t adequately either challenged or defended the standard Thomistic construal of, and criticisms of, Scotist positions on those issues where Thomists and Scotists disagree.  That isn’t surprising, and it’s a good debate to have.  Indeed, if the main debate in contemporary metaphysics were between Thomists and Scotists, we’d be in a very good place indeed!  Though we are, of course, a long way from that ever happening.

From the analytic side, Stephen Mumford has said some very kind things about the book.  He is, by the way, one of several contemporary analytic philosophers whom Thomists and other Scholastics ought to be reading.  His book Laws in Nature and a book he co-wrote with Rani Lill Anjum, Getting Causes from Powers, are particularly recommended to anyone interested in seeing just how fruitful a discussion between Scholastics and analytic philosophers is likely to be.

Vatican Clarification on Filioque

The PCPCU published in 1995 a text on the Filioque entitled “The Filioque: A Clarification”. It has good points. Yet, it is not without reason for criticism. Zizioulas among the Orthodox has criticized it. D. Coffey among the Catholics has criticized it (and quite well and incisively I might add).

I’d like to add a few minor observations.

First, the document speaks of the conflict between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’. This is the usual way in which the conflict is put. And it is understandable. However, it is not accurate.

The conflict is between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox churches. The Catholic Church is both Eastern and Western in terms of her theology and rites. (Both churches are Eastern and Western geographically.) Thus, we have an important ecclesiological correction to make to this picture. For there is but one true Church of Christ, and that is the Catholic Church. I consider that it is high time for ecumenical niceties to be sobered by realism. We cannot continue not to express the “fullness of the faith”. Part of that fullness is that there is also an exclusiveness. One true religion, etc.

Second, the document claims, “The Holy Spirit, therefore, takes his origin from the Father alone (ek monou tou Patros) in a principal, proper, and immediate manner” [Footnote Thomas Aquinas: ST Ia, q. 36, art. 3, ad 1.] This claim is problematic for two reasons.

We grant that the Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father, in the technical sense. That means, the Father is his principal without principal. It is not that the Spirit proceeds “less” from the Son. But that the Son, his principal, is himself from a principal. In short, the teaching here shores up the monarchy of the Father.

But it is odd to say that the HS proceeds from the Father alone in a “proper” manner. Is this opposed to an “improper” manner? Does it mean the term “proceeds” should not be linked to the Son? Does it mean that “proceeds” means only coming from an ultimate principal? Why then should the document include the expression “proceeds (ekporeuetai) from the Father through the Son?” Wouldn’t that be oxymoronic? Or is “proper” simply a redundant synonym for “principal”? These are questions.

Most important, however, is the misreading given to Thomas. The text aims to imply that the Spirit does not proceed “immediately” from the Son. (Or else this “alone” is part of a complex and thus misleading statement. Read as complex, it would mean: “Simply b/c the HS is from the Father alone in a principal way, therefore we can truly say HS is from the Father alone in a principal and immediate manner, although he is not from the Father alone in an immediate manner. Misleading to say the least!)

Thomas’s text is in response to obj. 1. Objection 1 contends: If the HS is “from the Father through the Son” then he is not immediately from the Father, which is false. So, the response is aimed precisely at that statement. Now, even the good Fathers of the English Dominican Providence have a translation that may be seen to ‘tilt’ in the direction the Clarification takes. However, Thomas only states the following in his response: (1) HS is from the Father immediately as from him; and (2) He is from the Father (this is understood in the Latin more clearly) mediately as from the Father through the Son. Thus, Thomas is not denying that the HS is from the S immediately. In fact, his entire theology contends he is from the S immediately.

 

Atheism and divine transcendence

I have a whimsical little essay on this topic at Crisis Magazine. At the center is what I take to be a Thomistic understanding of creation. It's pitched to a broad audience. But it might be something to refine and develop further in the future. Or it might not. Your comments would be much appreciated either here or at Crisis

Thomism, Synods, Heresy and the PRDL

Too much blog reading has caused many acquaintances to fall into hysterical fits concerning Church teaching and contemporary prelates.  Things were far worse in the fourth century and in the time of Honorius I.  It seems to me that people should spend less time on the Web and more time reading works written before 1700.  If you must use the Web, the best short discussions of Church and papal authority I know of are available through downloads that are linked from the Post-Reformation Digital Library.  See Dominic Banez, In II-II, q. 1, art. 10, dub. 2 (in Venice 1587, 183-212); Salmanticenses, Cursus Theologicus, tract. 17, disp. 4, dub. 1 (in Paris, 1879, vol. 11, 247-261).  Incidentally, Banez, pp. 194-196, explains clearly the errors of today's sedevacantists.  Banez is here: http://www.prdl.org/author_view.php?a_id=651 and the Salmanticenses here: http://www.prdl.org/author_view.php?a_id=2122 .  If you must use the Web, use the PRDL!