Vallier, Kevin. All The Kingdoms of the World: On Radical Religious Alternatives to Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. 295+xpp., hardback; $29.95.

Reviewed by Dr. John M. Macias (St. Mary’s Seminary & University)

Kevin Vallier, in his book All the Kingdoms of the World: On Radical Religious Alternatives to Liberalism, presents the first book-length critique of the contemporary revival of Catholic integralism. Vallier’s work seeks to show the insufficiency of Catholic integralism as well as other religiously motivated anti-liberal theories. Vallier ultimately rejects Catholic integralism because, as he argues, it cannot transition from a liberal order to an integralist one, it is intrinsically unstable, and integralism is fundamentally unjust. Liberals, post-liberals, and integralists will find much to take from this book. Vallier’s arguments set an agenda for integralists to expand and deepen their own philosophical and theological politics.

All the Kingdoms of the World contains three overall sections. Chapters 1–3 present the philosophical and theological principles of integralism as well as arguments in its favor. The heart of the work is chapters 4–6, which lay out Vallier’s objections to integralism. Chapter 7 offers a shortened critique of Confucian and Islamic anti-liberalism, and Vallier ends with an Epilogue offering a brief account of how liberalism might develop in the future and the place integralism could have within it. In the first chapter, Vallier gives a narrative history of contemporary integralism and its many figures, featuring Thomas Pink, Fr. Edmund Waldstein, and Adrian Vermeule. Vallier then defines integralism as the belief that states must advance the natural common good, the Church must lead men and women to the supernatural common good, and the Church may direct the state to enforce canon law in some limited instances.

Chapters 2 and 3 present the book’s attempt to “steelman” Catholic integralism. Vallier sees integralism as a serious—if fundamentally flawed—political theology. Chapter 2 argues that, in the context of Catholic intellectual and political history, integralists have a strong case for theological orthodoxy. Vallier argues that the Catholic Church’s own historical relations with civil authorities actually supports a broadly integralist interpretation of the Catholic teaching on religious freedom. Vallier offers a “symmetry argument” in the third chapter. He claims that classical natural law theorists, who believe that the state ought to support supernatural as well as natural goods, offer a more consistent political theology than New Natural Law theorists, who hold that the state ought to promote only limited natural goods. If the state should pursue natural goods, then it should also promote supernatural ones.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 contain the book’s sustained argument against integralism. In Chapter 4, Vallier objects to integralism on the basis that it is very unlikely to succeed in making a transition from a liberal order to an integralist state. Adrian Vermeule’s “integration from within” faces significant cultural and political opposition. At least in the short-term, Vermeule’s plan has little chance of success. The stability objection of Chapter 5 claims that integralism is not a moral order. An ideal integralist state will fail to secure agreement based on moral principles and will ultimately establish a cohesive social order through fear and coercion. As such, it cannot achieve moral stability. Chapter 6 accuses integralism of being unjust to Catholic citizens guilty of apostasy, i.e. those who were baptized as infants but choose to leave the Church as adults. Vallier views this punishment as unjust because baptism, on his account, does not obligate anyone to stay within the Church. Integralism is unjust because it violates a “right to leave.”

Chapter 7 and the Epilogue move on from the book’s main focus by first applying the transition, stability, and justice objections to Confucian and Islamic states. Vallier finds each of these religious anti-liberalisms ultimately inadequate according to his framework, but they differ in the degree and manner in which they come under the three objections. The Epilogue presents a brief statement of Vallier’s understanding of liberalism as well as a proposal for how small integralist communities could exist within larger liberal states. Vallier suggests that integralist cities in a liberal state might attain a significant degree of autonomy. The Monastic Republic of Mount Athos serves as the primary example of such a community with considerable political independence and that prioritizes the supernatural over the natural. Vallier then ends the chapter with proposals for how liberal institutions can, and in fact need to, adapt to changing circumstances.

All the Kingdoms of the World offers a systematic and detailed account of Catholic integralism. Liberal and integralist readers have much to take from this work. Liberals will likely find many good reasons to reject integralism. Vallier demonstrates how integralism falls afoul of some important liberal values. Integralists also have reason to engage with Vallier: his book affords integralists an opportunity to develop their own positions. Vallier notes at times that integralists are unclear on questions such as how liberalism will collapse or the criteria for discerning how the integralist state supports supernatural goods. Catholic integralists have not answered questions concerning the rights of non-Catholics in an integralist state and the kind of civil penalties they might administer for violations of canon law. At times, Vallier seems to imagine a harsh punishment for such crimes that imitate the corporal punishments and executions of medieval Church history. Few contemporary men and women have the stomach for burning heretics. Integralists should see Vallier’s book as an invitation to expand their views and add much needed detail. This would strengthen the integralist political theory and make it much more appealing to a modern audience.

The book does not give integralists a reason why they ought to question their non-liberal presuppositions. To be sure, Vallier shows why liberals should not be integralists, but he does not show why integralists should not be integralists. The transition objection certainly demonstrates that integralism faces significant practical challenges in the near future, but integralists would likely agree. The stability and justice objections find fault with integralism, but they do so based on liberal principles. The stability argument rests on the assumption of rational choice theory. Vallier claims this principle prescinds from any metaphysical or anthropological commitments, but integralists will reject this belief. The justice objection assumes a liberal notion of rights that are independent of goods. Perhaps most importantly, throughout these objections Vallier fails to consider the principle that law ought to lead citizens to virtue gradually. Followers of St. Thomas will urge that lawmakers must adapt to the people. Prudence often requires that states allow some evils because the cost of punishing them outweighs the benefit to the common good. This central notion of Catholic political thought, the common good, does not receive sufficient consideration in Vallier’s work. Integralists can argue that the common good requires that law permit some evils. This permission does not show a problem with integralism, but rather it illustrates a prudential choice concerning how to achieve the common good in concrete circumstances. Thus, integralists will see in Vallier an agenda for future research rather than a challenge to their core beliefs.